Category Archives: Charles H. Dow

The Dow and Recessions

The following is raw data on the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) versus the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) call of a recession from the peak to trough from 1900 to 2018.

Our aim is the determine if there is any coincidence or correlation between the two.  We’d also like to emphasize that it would be especially ideal if there is confirmation of the idea that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.

Simple Coincidence

Below is the simple coincidence of the DJIA and NBER.  This takes the date when the NBER calls a recession or an expansion and registers the level of the DJIA for the first trading day of month that an NBER call takes place and registers the level of the DJIA when the next NBER call begins.

The times when an recession was called but the DJIA was instead higher is indicated in red.  As an example, On August 1, 1918, the NBER indicated that there was a recession until March 1, 1919.  In that same period, the Dow increased from 80.71 to 85.58.

There was no instances of an expansion period being called by the NBER that was followed by a lower level in DJIA.

Date NBER DJIA
December 1, 1900 expansion 66.43
September 1, 1902 recession 66.55
August 1, 1904 expansion 52.73
May 1, 1907 recession 83.87
June 1, 1908 expansion 74.38
January 1, 1910 recession 98.34
January 1, 1912 expansion 82.36
January 1, 1913 recession 88.42
December 1, 1914 expansion 56.76
August 1, 1918 recession 80.71
March 1, 1919 expansion 85.58
January 1, 1920 recession 108.76
July 1, 1921 expansion 91.26
May 1, 1923 recession 97.40
July 1, 1924 expansion 96.45
October 1, 1926 recession 159.69
November 1, 1927 expansion 181.65
August 1, 1929 recession 350.56
March 1, 1933 expansion 52.54
May 1, 1937 recession 174.59
June 1, 1938 expansion 110.61
February 1, 1945 recession 153.79
October 1, 1945 expansion 183.37
November 1, 1948 recession 189.76
October 1, 1949 expansion 182.67
July 1, 1953 recession 269.39
May 1, 1954 expansion 319.35
August 1, 1957 recession 506.21
April 1, 1958 expansion 445.47
April 1, 1960 recession 615.98
February 1, 1961 expansion 649.39
December 1, 1969 recession 805.04
November 1, 1970 expansion 758.01
November 1, 1973 recession 948.83
March 1, 1975 expansion 753.13
January 1, 1980 recession 824.57
July 1, 1980 expansion 872.27
July 1, 1981 recession 967.66
November 1, 1982 expansion 1,005.70
July 1, 1990 recession 2,899.26
March 1, 1991 expansion 2,909.90
March 1, 2001 recession 10,450.14
November 1, 2001 expansion 9,263.90
December 1, 2007 recession 13,314.57
June 1, 2009 expansion 8,721.44
December 1, 2018 recession 25,826.43

There were 8 instances (17%) where there was no coincidence with the call of a recession or expansion and a commensurate decline or increase in the DJIA.

The above coincidence data is graphically represented below.  The areas in red includes the the divergence of the NBER call for a recession and the DJIA along with the period that immediately followed.  This is basically showing that any recession indication that is followed by an increased in the DJIA, and the subsequent expansion calls, are not considered to be coincidence until after the last expansion and the next coincidence of a recession call.

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Naturally, this puts the coincidence level at 65% instead of the previous 83%.  This is a literal take on whether there is a coincidence between the direction of the DJIA and when the NBER actually calls a recession or an expansion.  It could be said that the DJIA follows the directions of the NBER except that the call made for the economy usually takes place at least a year after the fact.

Recession Length and Coincidence

Another method for measuring the coincidence of the DJIA and the official NBER definition of a recession is to rank the recession by length.  In this case, we take the beginning of a recession and end of a recession and use the first trading day of that month and measure to the first trading day of the month when the recession is considered to have ended. Below is the ranking of the length recessions from shortest to the longest compared to the DJIA.

NBER peak NBER trough previous expansion (months) DJIA
January 1, 1920 July 1, 1921 10 -37.16%
January 1, 1913 December 1, 1914 12 -35.81%
July 1, 1981 November 1, 1982 12 3.93%
January 1, 1910 January 1, 1912 19 -16.25%
September 1, 1902 August 1, 1904 21 -20.77%
August 1, 1929 March 1, 1933 21 -85.01%
May 1, 1923 July 1, 1924 22 -0.98%
April 1, 1960 February 1, 1961 24 5.42%
October 1, 1926 November 1, 1927 27 13.75%
May 1, 1907 June 1, 1908 33 -11.32%
November 1, 1973 March 1, 1975 36 -20.63%
November 1, 1948 October 1, 1949 37 -2.97%
August 1, 1957 April 1, 1958 39 -12.00%
August 1, 1918 March 1, 1919 44 6.03%
July 1, 1953 May 1, 1954 45 18.55%
May 1, 1937 June 1, 1938 50 -36.65%
January 1, 1980 July 1, 1980 58 5.78%
December 1, 2007 June 1, 2009 73 -34.50%
February 1, 1945 October 1, 1945 80 19.15%
July 1, 1990 March 1, 1991 92 0.37%
December 1, 1969 November 1, 1970 106 -5.84%
March 1, 2001 November 1, 2001 120 -11.35%

In this perspective on the coincidence between recessions and the performance of the DJIA, we can plainly see that there is a 63% coincidence.  Overall, not a bad amount of coincidence.  However, we think that we can generate an outcome that is closer to 100% coincidence if we twist the data to fit our agenda.

There is a saying that “the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.”  We promise we didn’t make this up. Furthermore, we have quoted the venerable Richard Russell of Dow Theory Letters fame to prove our point.

"The stock market is an indicator for the economy, a leading indicator (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  October 4, 1967. page 2.).”

"Just as [Elliot] Janeway senses new leading indicator of the business-market condition, I too, often sense an index which I feel should be accorded great authority. Right now I would say it is world stock exchange averages (see last Letter). The leading stock markets of the world are now heading down in earnest (statistics in Barron's each week), and this has an ominous ring to it (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  August 29, 1973. page 6.)."

"...if you believe that the market is its own best leading indicator then you have to believe what this market is saying (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  September 19, 1984. page 2.)."

"I continue to remind my subscribers that the crucial issue here is NOT whether the CPI turns up or down next month, it’s NOT whether the leading indicators blip up or down in July. No, the critical issue here is the direction of the primary trend of the stock market (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  June 8, 1994. page 2.)."

For nearly 6 decades, Richard Russell impressed upon his readers that the market leads the way when it came to understanding the direction of the economy.  Naturally, William Peter Hamilton, fourth editor of the Wall Street Journal, had the following to say about the insights of the stock market:

“The market is not saying what the condition of business is to-day. It is saying what that condition will be months ahead (Hamilton, William Peter. The Stock Market Barometer. Harper & Brothers. 1922. page 42.).”

Not to be outdone, Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, has the following to say about the stock market as a leading indicator:

“The stock market discounts tendencies. Stocks went up before the improvement in business became pronounced.  Stocks will discount depression before depression actually exists, but this discounting quality in stocks make them run to extremes.  They discount shadows as well as substances and often anticipate that which does not occur (Dow, Charles H. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal. May 10, 1900.).”

We have spanned over 100 years of claims that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.  If this is true then we can then surmise that any of the years where the NBER called for a recession, the stock market had already embarked on a meaningful decline and if the data somehow shows a gain in stocks from a peak to trough period then it is because the decline and subsequent recovery was already in place.

Let’s see if the years when the DJIA registered a gain in the period from peak to trough of a recession was already preceded by a decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

Evidence of Market Coincidence preceding Economic Reality

NBER peak NBER trough DJIA date DJIA peak DJIA date DJIA trough % change
July 1, 1981 November 1, 1982 4/27/1981 1,024.05 8/12/1982 776.92 -24.13%
April 1, 1960 February 1, 1961 1/5/1960 685.47 10/26/1960 566.05 -17.42%
October 1, 1926 November 1, 1927 2/11/1926 162.31 3/30/1926 135.20 -16.70%
August 1, 1918 March 1, 1919 6/8/1917 98.58 12/19/1917 65.95 -33.10%
July 1, 1953 May 1, 1954 1/5/1953 293.79 9/14/1953 255.49 -13.04%
January 1, 1980 July 1, 1980 2/13/1980 903.84 4/21/1980 759.13 -16.01%
February 1, 1945 October 1, 1945 3/7/1945 161.52 3/26/1945 152.27 -5.73%
July 1, 1990 March 1, 1991 7/19/1990 2,993.81 10/11/1990 2,387.87 -20.24%

Of the eight periods when there was a positive change in the DJIA within the defined NBER recession, five of them had already experienced a decline and recovery which explains why there was a positive result in our initial review.

The remaining three periods declined after the NBER recession had already started.  However, each of the three DJIA troughs occurred before the end of the NBER trough.  In this respect, even in failure, the stock market managed to fulfill half of the market bromide.  This means that 93% of the dates provided by the NBER since 1900 for both recessions and expansions were led by stock market changes in conformity with the later call in the economy.

Conclusion

In our simple coincidence evaluation, we found that only 17% of the periods did not conform to the idea that stock markets coincide with recessions and expansions.  Somehow, all available data suggests that expansions in the economy are perfectly aligned with stock market increases.

When ranked by the length of the recessions, there is a clear majority of recessions that align with declines in the DJIA.  However, the minority of recessions that show DJIA gains is somewhat confounding.

However, when we recognize that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy, we find that the remaining 17% that don’t conform to the theory that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy shrinks to 6.52% when accounting for the fact that market gains during a recession result from the market having recovered in advance of the recession low.

Dentsply Sirona: Dodging Bullets

Review

On February 6, 2017, we took a position in Dentsply Sirona (XRAY).  Dentsply Sirona is a leading manufacturer of dental products provided to dentists throughout the world.  By February 8, 2018, we said the following of XRAY:

“At the time of the purchase of XRAY on February 6, 2017, we sold our shares of UNM Group (UNM) which had increased exceptionally from the February 5, 2016 purchase.  XRAY did not meet our goal [gaining +1.14%] and while UNM has gained +5.19% in the same period of time.”

On February 8, 2018, we sold our holdings of XRAY and the stock has subsequently declined –31.30%, a staggering loss in such a short period of time.

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Downside Targets

According to Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, a stock should be viewed from the context of when it last performed the worst.  Dow has the following to say (emphasis ours):

"The point of importance for those who deal in industrial stocks is whether the capitalization of the companies into which they propose to buy is moderate or excessive, when compared with the aggregate earnings of the various concerns forming the combination in a period of depression. It is probable that consolidated companies will be able to earn as much in the next period of low prices as the companies forming the combine were able to earn in the last one; hence the very foundation of investments in industrials should be knowledge of what these companies earned, say in 1893 to 1896, making, perhaps, reasonable allowances for economies under consolidation. Where the earnings so shown would have provided dividends for industrials now active, the fact must be regarded as a very strong point in favor of those stocks (George W. Bishop Jr., Charles H. Dow: Economist, Dow-Jones & Company,Princeton, 1967, page 11.)"

Without seeing the reported earnings, dividends, debt and shares outstanding, the price of the stock is the best quick take on the downside risk.  In theory, the price reflects some or all of the news and fundamental data on a given stock.  Looking at the price and applying the work of Edson Gould, we have estimates for the downside target.

Continue reading

Dow 50k by 2023? How about 177k by 2032?

In a USA Today article titled “Dow hitting 50,000 by 2023? Market milestone is within reach, investor claims”, money manager Charles Lemonides says, “…investors ‘should build their portfolios recognizing Dow 50,000 is a real possibility’ by 2022 or 2023.”

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This prediction sounds spectacular and harkens back to our January 3, 2018 article titled “Dow 130,000 by 2032.”  That article was premised on our November 2012 article suggesting that the secular bear market would end between 2016 and 2023.  After further analysis, in March 2013, we concluded that “…If the current implications are correct, we could be on the cusp of a run to Dow 100,000.”

What stands out about Lemonides’ forecast for the next five years?  While we were projecting a +12% compounded annual growth rate, Lemonides is forecasting a +15.09% compounded annual growth rate over the next five years.  If the +15.09% growth rate is projected out to 2032 then the Dow Jones Industrial Average would sit at 177,200.

Gold and the DJIA

Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, once said:

For the past 25 years the commodity market and the stock market have moved almost exactly together. The index number representing many commodities rose from 88 in 1878 to 120 in 1881. It dropped back to 90 in 1885, rose to 95 in 1891, dropped back to 73 in 1896, and recovered to 90 in 1900. Furthermore, index numbers kept in Europe and applied to quite different commodities had almost exactly the same movement in the same time. It is not necessary to say to anyone familiar with the course of the stock market that this has been exactly the course of stocks in the same period ( source: Dow, Charles. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal.February 21, 1901.)”

There is no exactness between the relative percentage change in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the price of a commodity like gold.  However, since the January 26, 2018 peak in the DJIA, there has been a lot of sympathy moves in the price of gold and the DJIA.

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Mercury General: Targets and Perspective

On August 14, 2012, when Mercury General (MCY) was trading at a price of $37.30, we said the following:

According to Morningstar.com, MCY is considered a “buy” at $31 and at fair value at $45.  Our own model suggests that MCY is significantly undervalued at $39 and a “buy” at $45. Investment Quality Trends (www.iqtrends.com) indicates that when MCY is at a yield of 4.5% or higher, the stock should be considered for purchase.  Currently, MCY has a dividend yield of approximately 6.60%.  Keep in mind that we do not buy stocks for their dividend yield.  Instead, we use the company’s consistently increasing dividend as the only proof that the company management can:

  • increase earnings over time
  • reward current shareholders

Since that time, we’ve seen Mercury General increase from $37.30 to as high as $64.52.  Along with the increase in price, we’ve been forced to revise our perspective on the stock.  Below, we will outline the revisions to our perspective and provide target prices we think MCY should be considered for acquisition.

Stock Market and Inflation Risk

A reader of our Dow 130k article has raised an important question about the risks that the stock market faces when confronted with the prospect of rising interest rates.  The reader says, in part:

“…they say that interest rates are mean reverting and based on where we are today (historically low) I would think that the betting man would bet that it can only go up from here.  If that is the case, I can't see a bull market in the coming years.

“What if the scenario is that we have permanent low inflation (Secular stagnation). Productivity improvements through outsourcing and technology innovation may explain this paradigm shift.”

We don’t have much to go by other than the historical record.  In this case, the historical record says the following:

  • Interest rates will go up
  • Inflation is broadly bullish for the stock market
  • the period of “low inflation” is behind us

In this article, we will examine, from a historical perspective, whether this is a new era where all of our claims are false or history will repeat.

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Dow 130,000 by 2032

Summary

  • In 1999, Warren Buffett said that stock market returns would underperform over the next 17 years.
  • Cycles indicate that the next 17 years will be a secular bull market.
  • Volume data and price recovery were the keys to the change in the trend.
  • Magnitude of secular trends in the past point to 10-fold gains in DJIA.
  • The work of Edson Gould in 1935, 1979 and today.
  • Look for average real compounded annual returns of +12% v. the historical +7% real returns.

UNP: What to Watch

On January 26, 2016, we posted an article about Union Pacific Corporation (UNP).  In that article, we made the case for the stock based on the distinction between a parabola and stock cycles.  The basis for our claim lies in the work of Charles H. Dow’s view on how and when to use market data.  According to Charles Dow:

"The point of importance for those who deal in industrial stocks is whether the capitalization of the companies into which they propose to buy is moderate or excessive, when compared with the aggregate earnings of the various concerns forming the combination in a period of depression. It is probable that consolidated companies will be able to earn as much in the next period of low prices as the companies forming the combine were able to earn in the last one; hence the very foundation of investments in industrials should be knowledge of what these companies earned, say in 1893 to 1896, making, perhaps, reasonable allowances for economies under consolidation. Where the earnings so shown would have provided dividends for industrials now active, the fact must be regarded as a very strong point in favor of those stocks (George W. Bishop Jr., Charles H. Dow: Economist, Dow-Jones & Company,Princeton, 1967, page 11.)"

Essentially, Dow suggests that the most compelling data is derived from when the stock experiences its worst performance, generally during a prior recession or depression low.  Looking at UNP from 1980 to 2015, we determined that the six periods (from peak to trough) in the stock price was more instructive than taking into account the entire period as a whole.  Our conclusion:

“The repeated pattern of declines greater than –30% is no coincidence.  These are the apparent cycles that UNP happens to experience. Furthermore, the level of consistency for UNP to decline on average –48% over the period from 1980 to 2008 (7 data points) indicates that this is very useful in determining what is “normal” for the current decline in the stock price.  Already UNP has fallen –43.16% which is generally in the sweet spot as we believe that the 2008 and 1980 declines were outliers in especially painful recessions.”

Since our January 26, 2016 article, Union Pacific Corporation (UNP) has increased in price by +57%.  Now, it must be said that such astronomical returns by a hum drum railroad company should not be expected to be normal.  At some point, there will be a reversion to the mean which includes the possibility of the stock price stagnating while the Dow Jones Transportation Index increases or declines at a greater rate than the Dow Jones Transportation Index in the next bear market.  That being said, let’s look at what to watch going forward.

"To know values is to know the meaning of the market. And values, when applied to stocks, are determined in the end by the dividend yield."

-Charles H. Dow

Quick Take: Ecolab Inc.

According to Yahoo!Finance, Ecolab Inc. (ECL), “…provides water, hygiene, and energy technologies and services for customers worldwide. The company operates in three segments: Global Industrial, Global Institutional, and Global Energy. The Global Industrial segment provides water treatment and process applications, and cleaning and sanitizing solutions primarily to large industrial customers within the manufacturing, food and beverage processing, chemical, mining and primary metals, power generation, pulp and paper, and commercial laundry industries.”

Since the bottom that occurred in the stock market in March 2009, Ecolab Inc. has outpaced the recovery in the Dow Jones Industrial Average by +94% and the S&P 500 by +66%.  At some point the pendulum needs to swing in the opposite direction.  It is our goal to point out the potential scenarios that are most plausible for the reaction that is to come for ECL.  First, we’ll cover some important fundamentals and what they indicate and then we’ll cover the topic of technical aspects of downside risk.

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Quick Take: Dover Corp.

According to Yahoo!Finance, “Dover Corporation manufactures and sells a range of equipment and components, specialty systems, and support services in the United States. The company operates in four segments: Energy, Engineered Systems, Fluids, and Refrigeration & Food Equipment. The Energy segment provides solutions and services for the production and processing of oil, natural gas liquids, and gas to drilling and production, bearings and compression, and automation end markets.”

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The price of Dover Corp. (DOV) has declined by –32.46% since the early July 2014 peak.  Looking at the stock, it appears that the downward spiral is locked in.  The following are some thoughts about the stock.

Continue reading

Apple meets NLO Upside Target

On August 19, 2014, Apple (AAPL) stock price rose as high as $100.66.  When Apple was trading at $61.61 on March 9, 2013, we said the following with the accompanying chart:

“Apple Inc. (AAPL) is at the top of our watch list as it is within 5% of the one year low.  In our April 14, 2012 test of the quality of Edson Gould’s Speed Resistance lines, Apple fell from $636 [adjusted price of $90.85] to our projected level of $424.15 [adjusted price of $60.59] (found here).  Now that the stock has achieved our downside target, we expected that a reaction to the upside is likely.”

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On July 17, 2013, when Apple was trading at $61.47, we re-affirmed our view of the upside potential for Apple with the following commentary:

“Currently, Apple is demonstrating a basing pattern that if successful, could result in a breakout to the upside.  At the current levels, we wouldn’t be opposed to buying some shares of Apple with the expectation that the stock could decline an additional –25% to –35%.”

The work of Edson Gould has proven to be astounding when considered in its context.  On April 14, 2012, we posted an article titled “Considering the Downside Prospects for Apple”.  At that time, we were revising the previous estimates of downside risk done on February 5, 2012 (third party source available here).

What was mentioned on February 5, 2012 is critical to understanding how Edson Gould’s downside projections work.  At the time, we said:

“The very first thing that we look for, to determine speed resistance lines, is the most recent peak in the price. Because AAPL is continually making new highs, we only need to use the latest price of $455.68 [post split price of $65.09] as our starting point….As the price of Apple increases, so too does the SRL lines based on the work of Edson Gould.”

This means that as long as the price of the stock increases to a new high the speed resistance lines are expected to increase as well.  Only when the stock starts on a declining trend can we expect that the stock price might go to the conservative and extreme downside targets.

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On April 14, 2012, when Apple was trading at $90.89 (pre-split price of $636.23), we said the following:

“…we believe that, based on the current speed resistance lines, no one would expect Apple to decline to our conservative downside target of $424 (post split price of $60.57)...”

The strength of Gould’s downside risk estimates is that we didn’t even have the peak price of $100.71 set on September 18, 2012 but we were still able to see the conservative downside target of $60.57 achieved.  Had we used the peak price, we would have achieved the $67.14 conservative downside target much earlier than the $60.57 level.

Gold Stock Indicator: October 9, 2013

Although gold and gold stocks declined, the Gold Stock Indicator (GSI) increased above the level from yesterday.  we’re currently sitting slightly above the “stage 4 buy” level which is based on the 2008 low.

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Our use of the 2008 low as a reference point is based on Charles H. Dow’s assessment of the best time to consider an investment:

“The point of importance for those who deal in industrial stocks is whether the capitalization of the companies into which they propose to buy is moderate or excessive, when compared with the aggregate earnings of the various concerns forming the combination in a period of depression. It is probable that consolidated companies will be able to earn as much in the next period of low prices as the companies forming the combine were able to earn in the last one; hence the very foundation of investments in industrials should be knowledge of what these companies earned, say in 1893 to 1896, making, perhaps, reasonable allowances for economies under consolidation. Where the earnings so shown would have provided dividends for industrials now active, the fact must be regarded as a very strong point in favor of those stocks.[1]”

The consideration of investments “in periods of depression,” “periods of low prices,” and “economies under consolidation” with the reference to 1893 and 1896 are all consistent with extremes in the investment cycle.  This definitely is the case for gold and more especially gold stocks.  Dow is telling us that investment considerations need to look back to the prior extreme lows for the best approximation for where investments will likely go to the downside in the current cycle and when those investments could be considered the best values. Naturally, in the next decline from a gold stock peak, we will need to use the 2013 low as the worst case scenario of downside risk.

The following are the dates and levels of gold and gold stocks (XAU) that were at or lower than the current level in the GSI.

Date Gold XAU
10/27/2008 $730.50 65.72
6/24/2013 $1,286.75 87.33
6/25/2013 $1,279.00 87.22
6/26/2013 $1,236.25 82.35
6/27/2013 $1,232.75 84.35
7/8/2013 $1,235.25 84.98
7/9/2013 $1,255.50 85.99
7/10/2013 $1,256.00 85.71
10/8/2013 $1,329.50 88.94
10/9/2013 $1,304.00 88.79

June 26, 2013 was the lowest point ever reached in the GSI since 1983.  While we’re not there yet, we expect that gold and gold stocks should bring us to the former low with some margin for error on the downside.

Citation:

  1. Dow, Charles. H. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal. April 27, 1899.

Silver: Downside Targets Met

As early as May 5, 2011, when silver was trading at $35 an ounce, we’ve maintained the view that the prospect of silver, in the form of the exchange traded fund iShares Silver Trust (SLV), falling below $20 was well within the realm of possibility (article here).  At the time, we said the following: Continue reading

Gold: 50% Principle

From a Dow Theory perspective, downside targets rely heavily on the concept of the 50% principle. Although mistakenly attributed to E. George Schaefer by Richard Russell, the 50% principle is derived from Charles H. Dow’s “great law of action and reaction.” Dow describes the “law” in the following manner:

The market is always responsive to the great law of action and reaction. The longer the swing one way the longer it will be the other. One of the best general rules in speculation is the theory that reaction in an advance or a decline will be at least one-half of the primary movement [50% principle].

The fact that the law is working through short ranges and long ones at the same time makes it impossible to tell with certainty what any particular swing may do; but for practical purposes, it is not infrequently wise to believe that when a stock has risen 10 points, and as a result of one or two short swings [double tops] does not go above the high point, but rather recedes from it, that it will gradually work off 4 or 5 points.[1]”

In another excerpt from Dow’s work, on the topic of the 50% principle, Dow says:

It often happens that the secondary movement in a market amounts to 3/8 to ½ of the primary movement.[2]”

Again, Dow emphasis the concept of the 50% principle:

Whoever will study our averages, as given in the Journal for years past, will see how uniformly periods of advance have been followed by periods of decline, amounting in a large proportion of cases to from one-third to one-half of the rise. [3]”

Finally, George Bishop, one of the greatest authors on the topic of Charles H. Dow, concludes:

The law of action and reaction applies to both the general market and to individual stocks. This law states that the reaction to an advance or decline will approximate half the original movement.[4]”

Dow Theory 50% Principle for Gold

Dow Theory downside targets for the price of gold, based on the peak of $1,895 and the initial  low of $252.80 based on the closing price, is charted below (July 20, 1999 and September 5, 2011, respectively):

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Citations:

  • [1] Dow, Charles H. Wall Street Journal. October 19, 1900.
  • [1] Bishop, George. Charles H. Dow and the Dow Theory. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. 1960. page 119.
  • [1] Sether, Laura. Dow Theory Unplugged. W&A Publishing. 2009. page 112.
  • [2] Dow, Charles H. Wall Street Journal. January 22, 1901.
  • [2] Bishop, George. Charles H. Dow and the Dow Theory. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. 1960. page 120.
  • [2] Sether, Laura. Dow Theory Unplugged. W&A Publishing. 2009. page 117.
  • [3] Dow, Charles H. Wall Street Journal. January 30, 1901
  • [3] Bishop, George. Charles H. Dow and the Dow Theory. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. 1960. page 120.
  • [3] Sether, Laura. Dow Theory Unplugged. W&A Publishing. 2009. page 199.
  • [4] Bishop, George. Charles H. Dow and the Dow Theory. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. 1960. page 231.