Category Archives: DJIA

DJIA Yield Profile: March 12, 2020

This bear market has taken everything in its path down. Unless you are shorting the market, there is nowhere to hide. Perhaps the most scary thing is that this downturn is probably far from over.

The rate of change for new cases for COVID-19 continue to rise and even accelerate. Until we see a deceleration in the total cases for the US, the market will continue to fall.

The first chart comes from worldometers.info which we believe has better data than WHO (data from WHO shows 0 new cases over the past weekend).

COVID19_ActiveCase_03.12.2020

Despite the bad news, we are persistent in keeping our focus on long-term investment opportunities. If and when this is behind us, there will be tremendous opportunity to purchase blue-chip companies that will provide you with higher than average income. Take the Dow Jones Industrial as example.

Based on the close of March 12, 2020, the dividend yield reached 3%. Contrast that with 10-year T-Bill which fell below 1%. The risk-premium on the Dow (based on yield) spike to 2%.

This is not an indication that a bottom is here or even near. However, from an investment perspective, investing $10,000 today in the Dow seems like a better bet than a bond that will mature in 2030.

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This too shall pass and we can't wait until then. Please take care of yourself and those around you.

DJIA Yield Profile: 1948-2043

In a July 1999 issue of Investment Quality Trends published by Geraldine Weiss, it was observed that a dynamic shift in the history of the Dow Jones Industrial Average may have been in the process.  Weiss said the following:

“For more than 100 years, the benchmarks of value for the Dow Jones Industrial Average have been 3.0% at Overvalue and 6.0% at Undervalue.  Now, the venerable D.J.I.A. has climbed so extremely high, it’s dividend yield has dropped to 1.5%…the lowest in history.  The situation intrigues us and causes us to wonder if the Dow is establishing a new profile of value between dividend yield extremes of 1.5% at Overvalued (where stocks should be sold) and 3.0% at the former Overvalued level (where stocks can be bought).  Throughout history, there has been a 100% differential between the high and low dividend yields at historical extremes.  The D.J.I.A. now is 100% above its historic benchmark of Overvalue.

“If in fact the profile of value has changed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (time will tell), then it is reasonable to assume that some blue chip stocks which also have climbed far beyond their historic levels of Overvalue, may be experiencing a similar fundamental change in their profiles of value.  We saw the other side of the coin in 1982, when interest rates rose to unprecedented levels and some interest rate sensitive stocks established extremes of high yield at Undervalue. (Weiss, Geraldine.  Should Some Overvalued Stocks Be Re-Evaluated? Investment Quality Trends. Mid-July 1999. page 12.).”

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1983-2010

Our updated dividend yield profile for the Dow Jones Industrial Average since Weiss’ 1999 observation is below:

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We’ve included the old high yield of 6% and old low yield of 3% with the new 1.50% overvalued level for contrast.

Because the March 2009 low fell short of the 6% dividend yield on the Dow Jones Industrial Average, many market analysts were not willing to accept the fact that the market would turn to the upside.  They waited and waited with the view that the rebound was a Fed induced rise rather than a fundamentals and values based increase.  Those same analyst were forces to wait out the most hated bull market in history, claiming a crash was coming for over 10 years.

1983-2043 Continue reading

The Dow and Spanish Flu of 1918-1920

Conventional wisdom suggests that a flu pandemic like COVID-19 would have resulted in a further decline in financial markets rather than a reversal of a long established declining trend.  That was not the case for the period from 1918 to 1920.

In the last worst case of a flu pandemic, known as the Spanish Flu from 1918 to 1920, we compare the movement of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to the Dow Jones Transportation Average (DJTA).

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In the period when it was on the ascent (late 1917), the Spanish Flu had seen the Dow Jones Industrial Average come off of a decline of -40.09%.  From the December 19, 1917 low, the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased approximately +81.37% by November 3, 1919.

The peak in the Spanish Flu occurred approximately November 1919.  This was in the midst of the Dow Jones Industrial Average’s run from the low in December 1917 to the 1919 peak.  After the 1919 peak in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the market declined -46.57% to the August 25, 1921 low.  The low in 1921 was the beginning of the monumental runs in the stock market with a market peak in 1929.

How many declines of -3% did the Dow Jones Industrial Average experience in the period from December 16, 1915 to December 16, 1921?

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What conclusions can be drawn from the above data?  In the period from 1918 to 1920, the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced 6 declines greater than -3% on the way to the peak in November 1919.  After the peak of November 1919, there were a total of 10 declines greater than -3% on the way to the August 1921 low.

Below we have broken the declines into a quarterly basis in the period from December 1915 to December 1921.

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With half of the declines of greater than -3% occurring in the fourth quarter of the year, we should expect that there is going to be more large declines to come.

The Dow and Bear Market Duration

YoY: DJIA 1901 to 2019

Below is a chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1901 to 2019 reflecting the year-over-year (YoY) percentage change.

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Please email us at "nloteam at newlowobserver dot com" for an updated to this chart.

The “Even Greater” Depression of 1990 to 2019

As the saying goes, “it is a recession when it happens to others and a depression when it happens to you.”

In the last “Great” Depression from 1929 to 1945, Americans were well aware of the pain and misery that was wrought on the nation.  There are even some who wrongly claim that the only reason the United States got out of the “Great” Depression was World War II.  Debates aside, below is a percentage change chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1929 to 1954, the period of time that it took for the index to get back to “break even.”

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There is no debate among the average American or Harvard economist about when the last “Great” Depression occurred in the United States.  However, when the exact same thing happens to one of our allies, it seem difficult for even the most esteem experts on the “Great” Depression to recognize the current depression simply because it isn’t happening to us.

That ally is Japan. To put our claim in context, we will show you the stock market of Japan as represented by the Nikkei 225 Index in exactly the same format as the Dow Jones Industrial Average above.

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Someone please tell us that what Japan is going through isn’t a depression. We use the stock market as the most accurate real-time reflection of the economy, politics, and social well being, which is nothing new to long-time readers of our work.

Let’s reflect for a moment, in Japan from 1989 to 2008:

  • interest rates have been in decline
  • quantitative easing has been applied
  • banks that were among the top 6 of 10 in 1989 are now either defunct or merged into each other

How is it possible, that a key measure of the health of a nation like Japan could suffer so much and not be recognized to be in an “Even Greater” Depression?

Look at the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1929 to 1954 again.  It took 25 years for the index to break even.  Now look at the Nikkei 225 Index, it has already been 29 years and the index is still –40% below the prior peak.

Let’s take a brief refresher course on what was said of Japan prior to the decline of 1990, this from the Dow Theory Letters as published by Richard Russell and dated May 12, 1989:

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Or how about the following, dated October 18, 1989:

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And this from November 29, 1989:

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And finally, this from April 5, 1989:

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It is not an uniquely American attribute to forget the past but to blithely walk past the “Even Greater” Depression within our midst while it impacts our ally is a brewing storm.

Investors, politicians, and citizens alike would do well to note the exact same (subtle and not so subtle) slights and invectives being lobbed around today.  Meanwhile, due diligence is necessary to first acknowledge the plight of an ally and act in the interest of both nations before it is too late.

The False Narrative of Stocks and Interest Rates

The good news about the Dow Jones Industrial Average is that it has been around for the last two secular periods of rising interest rates.  The first period is from 1898 to 1925 (27 years) and the second period is from 1942 to 1981 (26 years).  In this posting, we show how the crowd that claims rate increases are the death of stocks is false.

The False Narrative

The false narrative is as follows, “…the reason for the wealth creation in the U.S. since 2009 is due to the decline in interest rates.  Therefore, when interest rates start to increase there will be a crash in stock prices.”

The Facts

Let us review the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1896 to 1925 within a secular trend of rising interest rates.

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Let us review the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1942 to 1981, within the last secular trend of rising interest rates.

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In both instances, within the entire period of rising interest rates/inflation, the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased significantly.  Most interesting is the fact that the period from 1896 to 1925 had stocks offering substantial total returns due to lopsided par value stock and high dividend yields.  This puts much of the gains not calculated in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the pockets of investors and not the price of the index.

The False Narrative Crowd

It is very easy to make false claims.  However, the data tells a completely different story.  There will be stock market crashes in either secular trend in interest rates for various other reasons.  Strictly because rates are rising isn’t necessarily one of them.

Dow 2019 Technical Targets

Downside Targets Continue reading

The Dow and Recessions

The following is raw data on the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) versus the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) call of a recession from the peak to trough from 1900 to 2018.

Our aim is the determine if there is any coincidence or correlation between the two.  We’d also like to emphasize that it would be especially ideal if there is confirmation of the idea that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.

Simple Coincidence

Below is the simple coincidence of the DJIA and NBER.  This takes the date when the NBER calls a recession or an expansion and registers the level of the DJIA for the first trading day of month that an NBER call takes place and registers the level of the DJIA when the next NBER call begins.

The times when an recession was called but the DJIA was instead higher is indicated in red.  As an example, On August 1, 1918, the NBER indicated that there was a recession until March 1, 1919.  In that same period, the Dow increased from 80.71 to 85.58.

There was no instances of an expansion period being called by the NBER that was followed by a lower level in DJIA.

Date NBER DJIA
December 1, 1900 expansion 66.43
September 1, 1902 recession 66.55
August 1, 1904 expansion 52.73
May 1, 1907 recession 83.87
June 1, 1908 expansion 74.38
January 1, 1910 recession 98.34
January 1, 1912 expansion 82.36
January 1, 1913 recession 88.42
December 1, 1914 expansion 56.76
August 1, 1918 recession 80.71
March 1, 1919 expansion 85.58
January 1, 1920 recession 108.76
July 1, 1921 expansion 91.26
May 1, 1923 recession 97.40
July 1, 1924 expansion 96.45
October 1, 1926 recession 159.69
November 1, 1927 expansion 181.65
August 1, 1929 recession 350.56
March 1, 1933 expansion 52.54
May 1, 1937 recession 174.59
June 1, 1938 expansion 110.61
February 1, 1945 recession 153.79
October 1, 1945 expansion 183.37
November 1, 1948 recession 189.76
October 1, 1949 expansion 182.67
July 1, 1953 recession 269.39
May 1, 1954 expansion 319.35
August 1, 1957 recession 506.21
April 1, 1958 expansion 445.47
April 1, 1960 recession 615.98
February 1, 1961 expansion 649.39
December 1, 1969 recession 805.04
November 1, 1970 expansion 758.01
November 1, 1973 recession 948.83
March 1, 1975 expansion 753.13
January 1, 1980 recession 824.57
July 1, 1980 expansion 872.27
July 1, 1981 recession 967.66
November 1, 1982 expansion 1,005.70
July 1, 1990 recession 2,899.26
March 1, 1991 expansion 2,909.90
March 1, 2001 recession 10,450.14
November 1, 2001 expansion 9,263.90
December 1, 2007 recession 13,314.57
June 1, 2009 expansion 8,721.44
December 1, 2018 recession 25,826.43

There were 8 instances (17%) where there was no coincidence with the call of a recession or expansion and a commensurate decline or increase in the DJIA.

The above coincidence data is graphically represented below.  The areas in red includes the the divergence of the NBER call for a recession and the DJIA along with the period that immediately followed.  This is basically showing that any recession indication that is followed by an increased in the DJIA, and the subsequent expansion calls, are not considered to be coincidence until after the last expansion and the next coincidence of a recession call.

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Naturally, this puts the coincidence level at 65% instead of the previous 83%.  This is a literal take on whether there is a coincidence between the direction of the DJIA and when the NBER actually calls a recession or an expansion.  It could be said that the DJIA follows the directions of the NBER except that the call made for the economy usually takes place at least a year after the fact.

Recession Length and Coincidence

Another method for measuring the coincidence of the DJIA and the official NBER definition of a recession is to rank the recession by length.  In this case, we take the beginning of a recession and end of a recession and use the first trading day of that month and measure to the first trading day of the month when the recession is considered to have ended. Below is the ranking of the length recessions from shortest to the longest compared to the DJIA.

NBER peak NBER trough previous expansion (months) DJIA
January 1, 1920 July 1, 1921 10 -37.16%
January 1, 1913 December 1, 1914 12 -35.81%
July 1, 1981 November 1, 1982 12 3.93%
January 1, 1910 January 1, 1912 19 -16.25%
September 1, 1902 August 1, 1904 21 -20.77%
August 1, 1929 March 1, 1933 21 -85.01%
May 1, 1923 July 1, 1924 22 -0.98%
April 1, 1960 February 1, 1961 24 5.42%
October 1, 1926 November 1, 1927 27 13.75%
May 1, 1907 June 1, 1908 33 -11.32%
November 1, 1973 March 1, 1975 36 -20.63%
November 1, 1948 October 1, 1949 37 -2.97%
August 1, 1957 April 1, 1958 39 -12.00%
August 1, 1918 March 1, 1919 44 6.03%
July 1, 1953 May 1, 1954 45 18.55%
May 1, 1937 June 1, 1938 50 -36.65%
January 1, 1980 July 1, 1980 58 5.78%
December 1, 2007 June 1, 2009 73 -34.50%
February 1, 1945 October 1, 1945 80 19.15%
July 1, 1990 March 1, 1991 92 0.37%
December 1, 1969 November 1, 1970 106 -5.84%
March 1, 2001 November 1, 2001 120 -11.35%

In this perspective on the coincidence between recessions and the performance of the DJIA, we can plainly see that there is a 63% coincidence.  Overall, not a bad amount of coincidence.  However, we think that we can generate an outcome that is closer to 100% coincidence if we twist the data to fit our agenda.

There is a saying that “the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.”  We promise we didn’t make this up. Furthermore, we have quoted the venerable Richard Russell of Dow Theory Letters fame to prove our point.

"The stock market is an indicator for the economy, a leading indicator (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  October 4, 1967. page 2.).”

"Just as [Elliot] Janeway senses new leading indicator of the business-market condition, I too, often sense an index which I feel should be accorded great authority. Right now I would say it is world stock exchange averages (see last Letter). The leading stock markets of the world are now heading down in earnest (statistics in Barron's each week), and this has an ominous ring to it (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  August 29, 1973. page 6.)."

"...if you believe that the market is its own best leading indicator then you have to believe what this market is saying (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  September 19, 1984. page 2.)."

"I continue to remind my subscribers that the crucial issue here is NOT whether the CPI turns up or down next month, it’s NOT whether the leading indicators blip up or down in July. No, the critical issue here is the direction of the primary trend of the stock market (Russell, Richard. Dow Theory Letters.  June 8, 1994. page 2.)."

For nearly 6 decades, Richard Russell impressed upon his readers that the market leads the way when it came to understanding the direction of the economy.  Naturally, William Peter Hamilton, fourth editor of the Wall Street Journal, had the following to say about the insights of the stock market:

“The market is not saying what the condition of business is to-day. It is saying what that condition will be months ahead (Hamilton, William Peter. The Stock Market Barometer. Harper & Brothers. 1922. page 42.).”

Not to be outdone, Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, has the following to say about the stock market as a leading indicator:

“The stock market discounts tendencies. Stocks went up before the improvement in business became pronounced.  Stocks will discount depression before depression actually exists, but this discounting quality in stocks make them run to extremes.  They discount shadows as well as substances and often anticipate that which does not occur (Dow, Charles H. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal. May 10, 1900.).”

We have spanned over 100 years of claims that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy.  If this is true then we can then surmise that any of the years where the NBER called for a recession, the stock market had already embarked on a meaningful decline and if the data somehow shows a gain in stocks from a peak to trough period then it is because the decline and subsequent recovery was already in place.

Let’s see if the years when the DJIA registered a gain in the period from peak to trough of a recession was already preceded by a decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

Evidence of Market Coincidence preceding Economic Reality

NBER peak NBER trough DJIA date DJIA peak DJIA date DJIA trough % change
July 1, 1981 November 1, 1982 4/27/1981 1,024.05 8/12/1982 776.92 -24.13%
April 1, 1960 February 1, 1961 1/5/1960 685.47 10/26/1960 566.05 -17.42%
October 1, 1926 November 1, 1927 2/11/1926 162.31 3/30/1926 135.20 -16.70%
August 1, 1918 March 1, 1919 6/8/1917 98.58 12/19/1917 65.95 -33.10%
July 1, 1953 May 1, 1954 1/5/1953 293.79 9/14/1953 255.49 -13.04%
January 1, 1980 July 1, 1980 2/13/1980 903.84 4/21/1980 759.13 -16.01%
February 1, 1945 October 1, 1945 3/7/1945 161.52 3/26/1945 152.27 -5.73%
July 1, 1990 March 1, 1991 7/19/1990 2,993.81 10/11/1990 2,387.87 -20.24%

Of the eight periods when there was a positive change in the DJIA within the defined NBER recession, five of them had already experienced a decline and recovery which explains why there was a positive result in our initial review.

The remaining three periods declined after the NBER recession had already started.  However, each of the three DJIA troughs occurred before the end of the NBER trough.  In this respect, even in failure, the stock market managed to fulfill half of the market bromide.  This means that 93% of the dates provided by the NBER since 1900 for both recessions and expansions were led by stock market changes in conformity with the later call in the economy.

Conclusion

In our simple coincidence evaluation, we found that only 17% of the periods did not conform to the idea that stock markets coincide with recessions and expansions.  Somehow, all available data suggests that expansions in the economy are perfectly aligned with stock market increases.

When ranked by the length of the recessions, there is a clear majority of recessions that align with declines in the DJIA.  However, the minority of recessions that show DJIA gains is somewhat confounding.

However, when we recognize that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy, we find that the remaining 17% that don’t conform to the theory that the stock market is a leading indicator for the economy shrinks to 6.52% when accounting for the fact that market gains during a recession result from the market having recovered in advance of the recession low.

Dow Jones Industrial Average 10-Year Targets

Below are the valuation targets for the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the next 10 years. Continue reading

Diversification: DJIA vs. S&P 500

The long-standing view is that being diversified is better for the purpose of limiting losses.  the data from the most recent decline from the peak in the market confirms, for now, that diversification doesn’t matter.

DJIA S&P 500
1 day -0.94% -1.10%
2 days -4.06% -4.35%
3 days -4.27% -4.49%
4 days -4.12% -4.52%
5 days -4.77% -5.05%
6 days -5.48% -5.83%

As of October 11, 2018, and going backwards to October 3, 2018, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and S&P 500 have declined.  However, the extent of the decline defies the norms of diversification and concentration in investments.

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In all scenarios, the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined less than the S&P 500.  As an example, from the October 3, peak to the present, the DJIA declined –5.19% while in the same covered period, the S&P 500 declined –5.56%.

Conventional wisdom says that concentrated portfolios should rise more and fall more than diversified portfolio.  In theory, both the DJIA and S&P 500 are comprised with the same high quality stocks.  Therefore, the comparisons is supposed to be like-for-like.

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This brings us back to the October 9, 2007 to March 9, 2009 period, when the Dow and S&P 500 peaked and troughed, respectively.  Strangely, the more concentrated Dow Jones Industrial Average, counter to the conventional wisdom, declined less than the S&P 500.  The 3% difference seems to be small, however, the theory of diversification and its failure, suggests that the amount is huge.

Gold and the DJIA

Charles H. Dow, co-founder of the Wall Street Journal, once said:

For the past 25 years the commodity market and the stock market have moved almost exactly together. The index number representing many commodities rose from 88 in 1878 to 120 in 1881. It dropped back to 90 in 1885, rose to 95 in 1891, dropped back to 73 in 1896, and recovered to 90 in 1900. Furthermore, index numbers kept in Europe and applied to quite different commodities had almost exactly the same movement in the same time. It is not necessary to say to anyone familiar with the course of the stock market that this has been exactly the course of stocks in the same period ( source: Dow, Charles. Review and Outlook. Wall Street Journal.February 21, 1901.)”

There is no exactness between the relative percentage change in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the price of a commodity like gold.  However, since the January 26, 2018 peak in the DJIA, there has been a lot of sympathy moves in the price of gold and the DJIA.

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DJIA: The Weakest Link

If the saying that “you’re only as good as your weakest link” is true then investors need to pay attention to General Electric (GE).  In the price-weighted Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), GE has 0.38% of an impact on the DJIA.  Such a low impact on the index makes the movement of GE on the index almost non-existent.  However, the manner in which this ailment in the index is treated says a lot about the overall market.

Leaving aside the fact that General Electric has been in the Dow Jones Industrial Average since 1907, GE is the new, “As General Motors goes, so goes the nation.”  It isn’t that GE is as broadly diversified in domestic manufacturing that is the issue, though it broadly impacts many industries, instead, it is the continued share decline and the impact on pensions, insurance, 401k, retirement plans, and bank funds that are being adversely affected by cross shareholding of GE as it has declined into what appears to be oblivion.

The current environment affecting GE reminds us of the spiraling feedback loop of cross-shareholding (zaibatsu) in the Japanese stock market from 1989 to the present.  The fact that a clean cut could not be made with badly managed companies due to stock holding relationships only allowed the deferral of addressing the real problems within the market.  what was the impact of cross-shareholding on the Nikkei stock index in Japan?

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By all accounts, the decline in the Nikkei of –81.87% was due primarily because of the difficulty of disengaging the tangled web of cross-shareholding relationships.  Ultimately, improved prospects of Japanese companies came in the form of divesting cross-shareholdings.

In our opinion, the situation is the same with General Electric.  The managers of the Dow Jones Industrial Average have allowed the disparity between the top weighted Dow component (Boeing) to go far beyond the norm of the bottom component (General Electric), typically 10 times (before getting kicked out of the index) but now it is more than 24 times the value of GE.

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Had GE been removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average at 10x the value of the highest priced stock in the index (Boeing), GE would have been removed from the index in late August 2017.  The fact that GE has been allowed to remain in the index means that the managers of the DJIA are in denial of the problems at GE or are acting at the behest of fund managers hoping for a turnaround before dumping their shares.

Right now, the weakest link in the DJIA is allowed to stay afloat at the expense of millions of retirement funds who are required to hold “blue chip” stocks regardless of performance.  GE cannot claim to be “blue chip” especially if it gets booted from the DJIA.  Although, the accounting scandals and restatements since the Jack Welch era should have been the first indication that GE wasn’t a “blue chip” stock.

The cascading negative effect of not booting GE from the DJIA is far worse than the impact of kicking it to the curb.

Gold Stocks: Hedge Free

We have been quoted here on many occasions saying that when the general equity market takes a dive of –10% or more, so too does gold stocks by a greater margin.  Our point, gold stocks are not a hedge from general market drops.

In our September 24, 2014 article titled “Gold Stocks: Risks and Remedies” we highlighted the numerous instances from 1939 to 2011 of when the Dow declined by more than -10% and showed how either the Barron’s Gold Mining Index or the Philadelphia Gold & Silver Stock Index declined by a greater percentage.

In the recent decline of the DJIA from January 26, 2018 to February 8, 2018, the index declined –10.36%.  So how much did the Philadelphia Gold & Silver Stock Index (XAU) decline?  The XAU declined –11.57%.

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In the chart above, we have excluded the decline of –14.75% from January 24, 2018 to February 9, 2018 in the XAU index.  Add this to the growing list of instances of when the DJIA declines more than –10% and gold stocks also decline by a greater percentage.

Fastest 1,000 Points or Slowest +4.17%?

Saw this headline and almost did a spit-take.

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Fortune Magazine claimed to “fact check” whether history shows that this was the fastest 1,000 points.

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Sadly, Fortune never actually compares the current +4.17% gains to any other in the 122-year history of the DJIA.   You have to wonder if Fortune included the 15 years after 1972, when the Dow finally crossed over 2,000. 

To their credit, Fortune does say, “…the Dow has grown larger over time, meaning a 1,000 point move today is less significant percentage-wise compared to such a movement 20 years earlier.

Again, for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), going from 24,000 to 25,000 is equal a +4.17% change. As noted in Fortune, on a percentage basis, +4.17% isn’t much.  However, we have listed the gains above +4.18%  that took less than 34 calendar days since 1896.  Although there are too many to show, we’ve only relegated this to the last 45 incidents from the lowest percentage gain excluding multiple events in the same year.

Date DJIA % change days
July 21, 1897 4.21% 10
June 29, 1938 4.21% 1
November 27, 1905 4.22% 1
April 5, 2001 4.23% 1
November 30, 2011 4.24% 1
March 4, 1926 4.38% 1
December 24, 1902 4.43% 8
November 1, 1978 4.46% 1
November 2, 1904 4.50% 7
November 26, 1963 4.50% 1
January 15, 1934 4.52% 1
January 17, 1991 4.57% 1
February 9, 1931 4.62% 1
June 19, 1930 4.63% 1
May 29, 1962 4.69% 1
October 28, 1997 4.71% 1
October 9, 1974 4.71% 1
June 12, 1940 4.73% 1
February 11, 2010 4.75% 3
August 17, 1982 4.90% 1
March 16, 2000 4.93% 1
November 16, 1933 4.93% 1
November 12, 1896 4.93% 8
September 8, 1998 4.98% 1
May 17, 1915 5.02% 1
May 27, 1970 5.08% 1
October 16, 1903 5.11% 1
January 27, 1899 5.36% 20
August 17, 1898 5.41% 12
August 11, 1909 5.43% 22
December 22, 1916 5.47% 1
November 22, 1920 5.51% 1
February 5, 1917 5.77% 1
October 20, 1987 5.88% 1
October 20, 1937 6.08% 1
January 19, 1906 6.08% 14
October 7, 1929 6.32% 1
July 24, 2002 6.35% 1
May 10, 1901 6.37% 1
March 15, 1907 6.69% 1
March 23, 2009 6.84% 1
January 6, 1932 7.12% 1
November 10, 1911 8.27% 14
January 14, 1908 8.61% 11
September 5, 1939 9.52% 1

Analyst Estimates: DJIA November 2016

Below are the price projections based on analyst earnings estimates for the Dow Jones Industrial Average as of November 4, 2016. These estimates project the price change for the respective stocks over the next 12 months and the risk profiles associated with the estimates.

Continue reading