Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health. For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)
see also:
Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health. For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)
see also:
Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health. For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)
see also:
Below are the valuation targets for The Toro Company (TTC) for the next 10 years. Continue reading
Prior Year Watch List Review (May 10, 2019)
The best performing strategy from last year was low yield. While the S&P 500 rose +1.70%, the Dow lost -6.20%. Companies with low yield such as Rollins (ROL) and Becton Dickinson (BDX) rose +16% and +13%, respectively.
Interestingly, the high yield strategy would have set you back -41% with the majority of the losses driven from Occidental Petroleum (OXY) and Gap (GPS) which lost -73% and -67%, respectively.
| May 10, 2019 | ||
| Strategy | High | Low |
| Yield | -41.0% | -5.2% |
| P/E | -7.9% | -25.0% |
| Payout Ratio | -14.9% | -18.8% |
| P/B | -7.7% | -30.5% |
| Closest to Low | -40.5% | |
| S&P 500 | 1.7% | |
| Dow Jones Ind | -6.2% | |
| Top 5 companies except for Index | ||
U.S. Dividend Watch List May 8, 2020
What a strange time we are living in. The unemployment rate skyrocketed to level no one had seen before.
Meanwhile, the market continued to crawl its way back, with the major indexes such as the S&P 500 hitting positive territory since last year. It’s difficult to determine if this rebound is for real but we continued to ask the question, is this situation more dire than the financial crisis where the market fell more than -50%?
Below are 10 companies on our watch list. Continue reading
Posted in Dividend Achiever Watch List, Dividend Achievers, Dividend Watch List
Tagged members
Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health. For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)
Below is the Year-over-Year quarterly change in data for EPR Properties (EPR) from 2016 to 2020.
The trend appears clear. The only question is whether the peak in the price in 2016 is reflected in the peak in revenue and FFO in 2018.
What if Texas Pacific Land Trust (TPL) were to retain a dividend policy that was in place from 1982 to 2016?
This means that we took the dividend in 1982 and 2016, determined the compounded annual growth rate and applied it to Edson Gould’s Altimeter until 2020. The outcome provides an alternative view to our prior work on the downside risk to TPL and supports the claim by a commenter on SeekingAlpha.com that TPL could decline to approximately $25.
1982 to 2013
2009 to 2020
How We Did it
see also: All Prior reviews on TPL
Posted in downside, risk, Texas Pacific Land, TPL
Industry representatives say that FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health. For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the net earnings figure. (data source)
Industry representatives say that AFFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health. For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the net income figure. (data source)
The following is the breakdown of the Dogs of the Dow (found here) in week nineteen, compared to other fundamental ratios. Continue reading
On this date in 1901, the amazing ride known as the “Nipper Panic” ensued. this was a day that began with rumors and ended with incredible market turmoil.
Northern Pacific Railroad was referred to as “Nipper” back in 1901. On May 9, 1901, the price of Northern Pacific went from $160 to as high as $1,000 during the trading day, before settling at a price of $325 at the close.
What brought about such a panic? Two syndicates, supposedly working in unison to elevate the price of Northern Pacific, had a difference in opinion as to what was considered “high” and “high enough.”
However, in order to gain a sense of perspective on the Nipper Panic, we need to look at what Northern Pacific was trading at in the year prior to May 1901. On May 3, 1900, Northern Pacific had the following quotes (New York Stock Exchange. New York Times. May 3, 1900. pg. 11):
The above data indicates that the share price of Northern Pacific rose from $57.75 on May 3, 1900 to the closing price of $143.50 on May 7, 1901 (or +148.48%), shortly before the “panic” set in (New York Stock Exchange. New York Times. May 8, 1901. pg. 11.).
The way that syndicates worked, at the time, was a group of well-heeled investors (now called “accredited investor”)* proposed pushing the price of a stock up or down by informing the public of their plans after having bought a large share of a specific company. With this information, depending the names of the people involved in the syndicate, the general public would place their bets on the direction of the stock, either long or short.
In this instance, the involved syndicates were the Harriman and Hill-Morgan. Initially, the Hill-Morgan and Harriman syndicates were pushing up the share increase of Northern Pacific. However, at a certain point, some members of the Hill-Morgan syndicate felt that the shares had risen “enough” and began, in opposition of the syndicate, to sell their shares.
Meanwhile, the Harriman syndicate had automatic orders to buy any and all shares of Northern Pacific as soon as they became available. Being such large shareholders, market makers were more than glad to have a willing buyer at any price and put the shares to Harriman.
Unfortunately, the illiquidity of the market not having enough sellers to offset buyers caused the shares of Northern Pacific to attain the $1,000 level. The carnage imposed on the sellers/short sellers was only relieved once the syndicate participants agreed to ease their automatic buying and selling program.
This is why my econ professor emphasized that cartels don’t work in the long run (see OPEC). Someone is always going to get greedy and ultimately reneg on the agreed upon terms (see Saudi/Russian Oil price war). Not mentioned in that awesome econ class is that one party in the cartel will end up bruised and beaten beyond recognition while the other side could be considered a “winner” (see U.S./Canadian oil producers).
In this case, the breakaway members of the Hill-Morgan syndicate not only sold but they short-sold the shares of Northern Pacific. The brutality of the shares rising from $143.50 to $1,000 and then closing at $325.00 had to leave a mark.
Other data from the changes in price from May 8, 1901 to May 9, 1901:
see also:
*Notes:
Posted in Nipper Panic, Northern Pacific, On This Date
On November 30, 2018, we posted 10-Year price targets for Power Corporation of Canada (POW.TO) when the stock was trading at $26.35. At the time, we had estimated 2020 undervalued and extreme undervalued targets of $22.74 and $15.31, respectively.
Since November 2018, Power Corporation of Canada has had an intra-day low of $17.47 on March 23, 2020.
see also: All 10-Year Targets
Posted in POW.TO, Target Achieved
After our posting yesterday, Aaron’s announced that it beat estimates.
Check our updated undervalued and extreme undervalued price targets in our May 6, 2020 posting and see if Aaron’s is right for your risk profile.
Posted in AAN, Target Achieved
Below are the downside support lines for Twilio Inc. (TWLO) from 2016 to 2017:
Below are the downside support lines for 2017 to 2020: Continue reading
Below are the valuation targets for Aaron’s (AAN) for the next 10 years. We have made significant material changes based on the current data. Continue reading