Category Archives: REIT

Housing Prices and the Attack on Speculators

After reading a recent piece by Ann Pettifor titled “House Prices & Global Wall of Borrowed Money” dated January 18, 2023, we were struck by a point that was made to explain the increase in housing prices.  Pettifor says:

“As I wrote back in 2018: House prices have been blasted into the stratosphere, not by a shortage of supply, but by the excess of a potent propellant – finance.”

According to Peittifor, it is this “propellant” that, once withdrawn, should generate a decline in prices.

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Pettifor’s citation of The Guardian article from 2018 is noteworthy in one of the solutions to rising home prices that is proposed:

“The best way to do this is through the tax system. First for consideration should be a property speculation tax (PST), as in Germany.”

Leaving aside the Panama Papers showing all the different organizations and people that create shell companies for the sole purpose of getting around the tax system, a look at the German House Price Index after Pettifor’s 2018 article, as provided by Trading Economics (https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/housing-index), we can see that there is little material change in the trajectory in the price of homes. The period of 2018 is indicated by the red arrow on the chart below.  After 2019, house prices appear to rise at an accelerated pace.

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Was there a failure in the PST? Should the Germans have been more aggressive to stem the tide of speculation?  We don’t know. However, what we do know is that previous attempts at curbing the rapid rise in real estate prices, aimed specifically at speculators, from Singapore to the United States, have all failed.

Let’s cover a few of the attempts at curbing speculation from a very interesting article titled “Special Capital and Real Estate Windfall Taxes (SCREWTS) in CANZEUS: A Phenomenon.” by Donald G. Hagman and Dean Misczynski published in December 1975.  The key takeaways are:

  1. Australia: The Land Development Contribution Act, April 8, 1970.
        1. “But land prices kept soaring…”
        2. “The Liberal-Country Government repealed its own tax…”
  2. Vermont: The Tax on Gains from the Sale or Exchange of Lands, May 1, 1973.
        1. “If the theory is correct, land prices should increase less rapid…”
        2. “The reduction is apparently mostly due to to the recessed economy rather than to any changes in the law.” This shows how windfall taxes mark the top in speculative environments and generate less revenue that initially anticipated and don’t stop the speculation as was intended.
  3. New Zealand: The Property Speculation Tax Act of 1973
        1. “Specifically aimed at curbing speculation in land…”
        2. “But that tax is so focused on ‘speculators’ that relatively few transactions are actually caught.”
  4. Canada: The Land Speculation Tax Act, 1974
        1. Spiraling land prices blamed on foreign speculators prompted the tax.
        2. Thought to generate $25 million in the first year, $55,450 in the first four months.

By all appearances, the legislative efforts to reduce land speculation has failed.  in addition, it is noted by Hagman and Misczynski that “these taxes have largely been imposed in turbulent, initially booming land markets, under dynamic circumstances that complicate realistic analysis and render all conclusions moot.”

In 2013, Singapore, after the doubling in property prices:

“…added measures to curb speculative buying - Singaporeans have to pay additional tax when they buy their second homes. Three years ago, the government modified loan schemes for select housing projects and asked foreigners and companies buying properties to pay additional taxes.”

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The red circle in the Price Index of HDB Resale Flats highlights when the tax was added.  As with the history of windfall taxes, they generally occur at a natural peak in the market.  The problem with this is that it is thought that the tax alone is the reason for the decline in prices.  Additionally, once the decline arrives it is realized that there are insurmountable losses in the economy rendering it more unlikely that those who were supposed to benefit from the tax legislation can’t due to their inability to qualify for new stricter loan standards, caused by the decline.

To better understand the role of government in the effort to address the needs to the public, an important step is understanding of past failures.  Too often, strategies are devised in reaction to public outcry and once implement at significant cost, are retracted meekly and hardly with as much pomp. Market forces are out of the control of government and even when the government thinks it is in control a black market or workaround is devised.  

Critical Points

  • Tax schemes are already circumvented by those who can afford to hire the experts (big accountants and consulting firms).  This leaves only those who can’t afford to pay experts to either break the tax law or become the primary targets of the law.
  • Government isn’t the problem, but it isn’t the solution on these challenging housing issues.
  • Windfall taxes are usually instituted at the top in the market.
  • When windfall taxes aren’t at the top in the market, they show little or no effect on the trajectory of the price increase that follows.
  • A person unable to afford an overpriced property is more likely to get a loan from a bank in a booming market (high prices) than the same person in a declining market (low prices).
  • Markets work in spite of the government, not because of the government.

Sources:

Equity Residential (EQR) Q1 2020

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

see also:

Equity Residential (EQR) Q2 2020

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Public Storage (PSA) Q2 2020

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Digital Realty Trust Inc. (DLR) Q2 2020

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of AFFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Digital Realty Trust Inc. (DLR) Q1 2020

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Richard Russell Review: July 5, 1974

This from Dow Theory Letters on July 5, 1974.

"What’s happening, what’s gone wrong? The answer: there's a giant squeeze in world liquidity, and it is scaring the devil out of investors, large and small, from one end of the globe to the other. Last week two German banks declared bankruptcy, while it was revealed (WSJ, June 26) that an oil-drilling "tax write-off" situation has turned into what may be the biggest swindle in US history. On June 27 trading in Westinghouse was halted at 12 1/8 (“you can be short if it’s Westinghouse”), and an hour later the President of the company announced that the outfit was solvent (all this while WX broke its 1962 low) (page 1)."

Those two German banks were Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt of Cologne and Bass & Herz Bankhaus.  This was a situation where the failure of Herstatt led to the failure of Bass & Herz and a host of other substantial losses. 

Chase Manhattan Bank was in possession of $156 million in Herstatt deposits.  This meant that U.S. creditors (namely Citibank’s British banking unit of Hill, Samuel & Co.) were seeking claims on these funds even though Chase Manhattan had no authority to recognize the claims. 

Seattle First National Bank (SeaFirst) was caught in a bind when they performed a $22.5 million transaction at their Swiss subsidiary and the funds were not transferred to the parent company hours before Herstatt was forced into bankruptcy.

In classic scam fashion, the oil-drilling "tax write-off" scheme was named Home-stake Production Company of Tulsa Oklahoma.  Using the name “Homestake” tied the swindler with the success and stability of Homestake Mining while not having achieved anything of note. 

What made this swindle exceptional is the fact that people like Liza Minelli, Candice Bergen, and Buddy Hackett (as well as Congressmen) were involved in the money losing fraud.  The motivation for getting into these “tax write-off” schemes might have been inspired, at the peak, by articles like the following from Barron’s in March 1974.

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“Bank shares at 10% yields mean that investor are scared of the banks (page 2).”

It was not long before this comment was published on banks that banks were on a mad dash to lure investors and analysts.  In a Barron’s article titled “Beautiful Balloon?” it was indicated that the 1970  amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 led banks “…into related (and some not-so-related) financial areas.

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It was those related financial areas that banks had “…been heavily engaged in financing real estate activities, and, despite the debacle among REITs, thus far have escaped essentially unscathed.”  It wasn’t long before those banks almost paid the price for their foray into REITs, until the government intervened.  This article from Barron’s should have been titled “Beautiful Bubble” as the collapse was in the early stages at this time and by July 5, 1974, there was more pain until December 1974, to the tune of –27.04% in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

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see also: Homestake Mining: The Exception that Proves the Rule

REITs: It’s Complicated

In an article titled “Retail REITs: Double-Digit Yields, Secular Shifts And Mean-Reversion” (link), it was recently proposed that:

“If you believe in a mean-reversion, REITs with sound balance sheets and strong value drivers should be considered in the portfolio.”

This quote on REITs seems accurate if you’re willing to overlook that publicly traded REITs have existed since the late 19th century.  Since that time, there have been many fits and starts and resets making for a complicated outcome in the publicly trade REIT market.

In the same article, a graph was presented to demonstrate the general ebb and flow of the REIT market, or markets in general, that graph is illustrated below:

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Following this graph is the mention of Macerich Co. (MAC) with the following remark:

“Let's take MAC as an example here. In my recent article "Macerich: 2 Scenarios Of Default - Positive For Value Investors", I calculated that MAC trades at a significant (at least 75%) discount to its NAV. It is hard to believe that such a discount will exist forever.”

The reality of this specific example [MAC], on a total return basis (adjusted for dividends and splits) is far from the ascending average with a range in price from undervalued to overvalued extremes. 

Below is the history of Macerich (MAC) from 1994 to the present:

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Macerich Co. (MAC) could be exceptionally undervalued and likely to survive the current market malaise.  However, on an adjusted basis, MAC has recently been where is has been in 2008, 1999, and 1995. 

So while the prospects are bright for Macerich Co., if we excluded the complicated history of publicly traded REITs and that on an adjusted basis MAC does not have an ascending average over time, there is a limit to what an investor should be willing to accept in exchange for the hard earned capital.

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The Gist: REIT Data Review

On August 23, 2016, the folks at Hoya Capital Real Estate provided data on the real estate investment trust (REIT) sector that we believe is bearing fruit.

In the table below, the apartment sector of REIT’s is covered.  The data columns include AFFO/G, current AFFOx, and forward AFFOx ratios.

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We took the current AFFOx column and looked at the performance of the REIT that had the highest and lowest ratios and ran a simple comparison of the REIT charts to determine the performance from August 23, 2016 to May 25, 2020. Our goal is to see if, on a spectrum of highest to lowest AFFO ratios, which had performed better.

In this case, it was Apartment Investment and Management Co. (AIX) with the highest current AFFO ratio and Mid-America Apartment Communities Inc. (MAA) with the lowest AFFO ratio.  Below is the performance of the two REITs from August 23, 2016 to May 25, 2020.

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This is a single grab of data between only the highest and lowest current AFFO ratios within a narrowly defined subset of the REIT industry.  However, the results, especially after the recent crash in the REIT market, are fascinating. 

We think that the continued emphasis on the hard data by Hoya Capital will prove instrumental in understanding the complexities of the REIT sector.  Furthermore, as the data grows with the passage of time, we expect that, in the realm of REIT investing, Hoya Capital is on the right path and we recommend reviewing their work for anyone serious about buying REITs.

American Tower Q1 2020 Chart

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of AFFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Tanger Factory Outlet Q1 2020 Chart

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Simon Property Group Q1 2020 Chart

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

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Federal Realty Q1 2020 Chart

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Industry representatives say that steadiness of FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the wide variability of the net income figure. (data source)

National Net Properties Q1 2020 Chart

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Industry representatives say that FFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the net earnings figure. (data source)

EPR Properties Q1 2020 data

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Industry representatives say that AFFO is more reflective of a REIT’s health.  For the purposes of determining the future direction of the stock price, we prefer the net income figure. (data source)