Category Archives: Seth Klarman

Seth Klarman Review: Margin of Safety-Chapter 2

The following is a line for line analysis of chapter two of Seth Klarman's book Margin of Safety. we're providing the concept or idea that we think is being conveyed followed by the quote or concept and page where you can find the citation. Additionally, we follow-up with our thoughts on the concept. We hope to review the complete book one chapter at a time.
According to GuruFocus.com, "Seth Klarman is a value investor and Portfolio Manager of the investment partnership The Baupost Group. Founded in 1983, The Baupost Group now manages $7 billion, and has averaged returns of nearly 20% annually since their inception. Seth Klarman is the author of the book 'Margin of Safety' which sells for over $1000."
Chapter Two 
  • Wall Street is Plagued by Conflict of Interest
    • As Wall Street pursues its various activities, however, it frequently is plagued by conflicts of interest and a short-term orientation. Investors need not condemn Wall Street for this as long as they remain aware of it and act with cautious skepticism in any interactions they may have.” (page 20)
        • It should be assumed that a conflict of interest is par for the course when crossing paths with Wall Street. Therefore, we needn’t be upset or worried when companies, acting in accordance with the goals of Wall Street, conduct business in a similar fashion. As investors we need to plan our strategies around the worst outcomes that have been the result of Wall Street “activities.”
  • Wall Street Compensation
    • Wall Streeters get paid primarily for what they do, not how effectively they do it.” (page 20)
        • Again, this extends to corporations that play the Wall Street game. If “The Street” feels that stock buybacks are an effective way to increase shareholder value then the corporations will do it. Although we have sat in on VC meetings where the head of a company explicitly said that share buyback are worthless as a strategy for increasing shareholder value.
  • Create a New Product, Generate a Higher Fee
    • Sometimes the lust for underwriting fees drives Wall Street to actually create underwriting clients for the sole purpose of having securities to sell.” (page 22)
        • The creation of ETFs, which were supposed to more effectively compete with Index Funds or supplant sector funds, seems to fit the bill in this regards since there is considerable question of whether the ETFs actually hold the asset they claim to be in possession of; either stock or commodities (article here). Now, with ETFs veering away from tracking indexes and sectors while allowing “fund managers,” we openly wonder what the difference between an ETF and the product it is supposed to replace. In our opinion, the primary difference, based on SEC filings on the matter, is collecting a fee without actual ownership of an asset. Thereby rendering the small “management fee” of an ETF into super profit in comparison to the traditional mutual fund and index fund.
  •  Buyer Gullibility is the Key
    • The periodic boom in closed-end mutual-fund issuance is a useful barometer of market sentiment; new issues abound when investors are optimistic and markets are rising. Wall Street firms after all do not force investors to buy these funds. They simply stand ready to issue a virtually limitless supply since the only real constraint is the gullibility of the buyers.” (page 24)
        • Thankfully, none of the products that are consumed by the retail investor are done forcibly. However, this goes back to the idea that Klarman mentions about avoiding market fads in the introduction of his book…“The important point is not merely that junk bonds were flawed (although they certainly were) but that investors must learn from this very avoidable debacle to escape the next enticing market fad that will inevitably come along (page xvii). All too often, investors ignore history which often reveals how easily a fad can take off. In the following quote, Klarman implies that a good rule of thumb on determining what a market fad is based on how long the product has been in existence, “Although newly issued junk bonds were a 1980s invention and were thus untested over a full economic cycle, they became widely accepted as a financial innovation of great importance…” (page 14). We would add to that rule of thumb by including that the more removed from actual ownership the less incentive there is to invest.
  •  Up Front Fees lead to Short-Term Focus
    • Brokers, traders, and investment bankers all find it hard to look beyond the next transaction when the current one is so lucrative regardless of merit.” (page 24)
        • The concept of market share often leads to the belief that the other firm is going to eat your lunch. This ignores the fact that the other firm isn’t using a qualitative standard for entering into such transactions. This leads to all firms chasing any opportunity for a fee at the expense of the company, the industry and the customers.
  •  A Bullish Bias Forgets Risk
    • …with so much attention being paid to the upside, it is easy to lose sight of the risk.” (page 26)
        • In our approach to any investment that is made, the priority is always on the likelihood of loss. The focus on loss requires the expectation that an investment will decline in value and having a reasonable strategy in place to deal with such scenarios before the investment is made. This makes our Investment Observations seem less enthusiastic as compared to someone who might think that a particular stock is reasonably undervalued.
  •  Declines must be orderly, increases can run amuk
    • Any downturn, according to the regulatory mentality [government regulators], should be free of panic. (Disorderly rising markets are of no evident concern)” (page 26).
        • This is best demonstrated when circuit breakers were introduced for the New York Stock Exchange after the crash of 1987. In an ironic twist, circuit breakers were never triggered based on downside movement of the NYSE in the period from 2007 to 2009. So much for the effort to protect investors with circuit breakers. Another example of regulator bias against the downside is the requirement and/or effort to reintroduce the uptick rule for short sellers without a commensurate downtick rule for investors going long a stock.
  •  Undervalued conditions get resolved, Overvalued conditions can persist
    • Correcting a market overvaluation is more difficult than remedying an undervalued condition. With an undervalued stock, for example, a value investor can purchase more and more shares until control is achieved or, better still, until the entire company is owned at a bargain price. If the value assessment was accurate, this is an attractive outcome for the investor. By contrast, overvalued markets are not easily corrected; short selling, as mentioned earlier, is not an effective antidote. In addition, overvaluation is not always apparent to investors, analysts, or managements. Since security prices reflect investors’ perceptions of reality and not necessarily reality itself, overvaluation may persist for a long time”(page 28).
        • This paragraph is the singular reason not to utilize the momentum investor’s approach of buying stocks that have made new highs. This is the method CNBC’s Cramer or Investor Business Daily’s William O’Neil tend to espouse. Whenever we seek out stocks at or near a new low, we’re trying to verify if the fundamentals of the company coincide with the price action of the stock.
  •  Always opt for the conservative estimate
    • The fad becomes dangerous, however, when share prices reach levels that are not supported by the conservatively appraised values of the underlying business” (page 34).
        • In our opinion, conservative estimates, as they relate to a stock at a new 52-week high is always lower. For a stock within 10% or 15% of the high, the high is the upside limit with expectations of a downside target. For a stock at a new low, our conservative expectation is 10% to 15% higher with a target at the next lowest technical level. If the stock is 10% or 15% above the low then we conservatively expect a possible 10% increase with the downside at least to the new low level. The same could be said for expectations for any of the fundamental attributes of a company. However, we tend to use the next lowest full year figures available or worst case figures that are not in the negative. This is the way to conservatively consider the prospects of any company at the same time always mindful of the risk of loss regardless of our confidence in our conservatism.
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Seth Klarman Review: Margin of Safety-Chapter 1

The following is a line for line analysis of chapter one of Seth Klarman's book Margin of Safety. we're providing the concept or idea that we think is being conveyed followed by the quote or concept and page where you can find the citation. Additionally, we follow-up with our thoughts on the concept. We hope to review the complete book one chapter at a time.
According to GuruFocus.com, "Seth Klarman is a value investor and Portfolio Manager of the investment partnership The Baupost Group. Founded in 1983, The Baupost Group now manages $7 billion, and has averaged returns of nearly 20% annually since their inception. Seth Klarman is the author of the book 'Margin of Safety' which sells for over $1000."
Chapter One
  • Know the Difference
    • Knowing the difference between saving & investing and investing & speculating is very important. Also important, the difference between assets and liabilities. p.3.
        • From personal experience there is much confusion about what savings actually is. Money that is consistently put into a bank account and not touched unless there is an emergency is savings. Money that is put into a 401k and invested in a stock mutual fund is not savings. Too often the reflexive remark about contributions to a 401k is that the money is savings for retirement. The only way this is possible is if the money is put into a money market account. Anything else is investing which incurs the attribute of risk of loss.
  • 3 Things Investors want
    • Investors expect 3 things when they invest: free cash flow which is translated into a higher stock price or dividend payouts; higher multiple that others are willing to pay for; narrowing of the gap between share price and business value. p. 4.
        • The latter to of three things that investors should want are solely dependent on the realization of the markets that the company in question is worth either paying more for which in turn narrows the gap between share price and business value. Free cash flow reflected in the form of the dividends does not rely on the hopes and expectation of other investors. Either the dividend is paid or it isn’t.
  • Speculators have Faith
    • Speculators, by contrast, buy and sell securities based on whether they believe those securities will next rise or fall in price. Their judgment regarding future price movements is based, not in fundamentals, but on a prediction of the behavior of others.” p. 4.
        • Strong beliefs are what allow investors and speculators to hope that what they’re doing is right without proper consideration of the risks. This seems to be why many investors would rather rely on “conventional” market wisdom like diversification and holding stocks for the long term. Somehow the faith in a financially stable promise land in some far distant future is more appealing than the evidences of the past and the “here and now.” It goes without saying that financial markets have the tendency to spite long held superstitions bandied about as market truisms.
  • Untested Over an Economic Cycle
    • Although newly issued junk bonds were a 1980s invention and were thus untested over a full economic cycle, they became widely accepted as a financial innovation of great importance…” p.14
        • Anyone investing, or saving for that matter, that isn’t aware of economic cycles is likely to pay for investing instead of get paid by investing. Likewise, for anyone who is actually trying to save, those who understand interest earn it, those who don’t pay it.
  • Yield Pigs
    • Double-digit interest rate on U.S. government securities early in the decade [1980] whetted investors’ appetites for high nominal returns. When interest rates declined to single digits, many investors remained infatuated with the attainment of higher yields and sacrificed credit quality to achieve them either in the bond market or in equities.” P.14
        • This reflects investors fighting the last war rather than the current or future battles. The key to future confrontations lies in an intimate knowledge of the distant past. The key to the current environment is in the ability to avoid the popular strategies that have proven not to work in the recent past.
  • Get to know the difference between yield on capital and return of capital.
    • Yield Pigs are easily confused about return of capital masquerading as yield on capital. Fancy “widow-and-orphan” products or otherwise “safe” investments with high returns are often created with the stated return leaving out the important fact that investors may in fact be receiving their initial investment as part of the “income.” p. 15.
        • The challenge of investing of requires a basic understanding of the difference between getting a return on your capital versus a return of capital. Many investors strive to obtain high yield at the risk of either getting a return of their capital if their lucky or a return that is inferior in the long run simply because exceptionally high yields are guaranteed to last for only so long.
  • Bond yields low? Maybe stocks are too high.
    • When bond yields are low, share prices are likely to be high.” p. 16.
        • This is a matter that constantly lurks in the back of my mind when I hear someone comparing stocks with high dividend yields to government bonds. I worry that there may be something in the stock yield we don’t know about. On the spectrum of risk, we know that the government bond has a greater chance of being repaid whereas the stock’s dividend can be cut at any point.
  • Backward looking investment formulas consistently misguide investors.
    • Other formulas incorporate investment fundamentals such as price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios, price-to-book-value ratios, sales or profit growth rates, dividend yields, and the prevailing level of interest rates. Despite the enormous effort that has been put into devising such formulas, none has been proven to work.” p. 17.
    • Investors would be much better off to redirect the time and effort committed to devising formulas into fundamental analysis of specific investment opportunities.” p. 18.
        • The most blatant deceptions are often the most widely disseminated or misconstrued. Based on Mr. Klarman’s example, it could easily be said that the New Low Observer is among the active participants in such a farce. We don’t argue this point. We readily admit that we don’t know as much as a Buffett, Soros, Lynch or Rosenburg. What we do know is that we attempt to accept our failures and try to learn from them rather than move on to the next investment fad that we have absolutely no clue about.

 

Please revisit New Low Observer for edits and revisions to this post. Email us.

Seth Klarman Review: Margin of Safety-Introduction

The following is a line for line analysis of Seth Klarman's book Margin of Safety.  we're providing the concept or idea that we think is being conveyed followed by the quote and page where you can find the citation.  Additionally, we follow-up with our thoughts on the concept.  We hope to review the complete book one chapter at a time.

According to GuruFocus.com, "Seth Klarman is a value investor and Portfolio Manager of the investment partnership The Baupost Group. Founded in 1983, The Baupost Group now manages $7 billion, and has averaged returns of nearly 20% annually since their inception. Seth Klarman is the author of the book "Margin of Safety" which sells for over $1000."

Introduction
  • Where investors go wrong
    • "Avoiding where others go wrong is an important step in achieving investment success. In fact, it almost ensures it.” p. xiii
        • In order to know where investors go wrong a person must first determine where and when the biggest mistakes have been made. Examining history and market tops, along with subsequent declines, help an investor to see the errors that were made right before the errors were fully revealed. In addition, the best assessments of a market decline are done afterwards as well. Hence, books like Security Analysis that followed the Crash and Depression of 1929.
  • Risk/Reward
    • Before you can focus on the remote possibility of rewards the market has to offer, you must first focus on the probability of risk of loss. p.xiii
        • No amount of stock market analysis is worth pursing if an assessment of loss, with the expectation of at least 50% loss, is not part of the equation.
  • Margin of Safety
    • Value investors should always allow “…room for imprecision, bad luck, or analytical error in order to avoid sizable losses over time.” p.xiv
        • Margin of safety means that the stock analyst expects to be wrong about their assessment and wouldn’t panic when the company that they’ve “invested” in doesn’t perform as planned.
  • The Ignorance of Indexing
    • …Indexing strategies [are] designed to avoid significant underperformance at the cost of assured mediocrity.” p. xv
        • Being categorically against indexing of all sorts, either through ETFs, Index Funds or mutual funds, it is quite apropos that Klarman would say this.
  • Know the Rationale of the Rules
    • …observing a few rules isn’t enough. Too many things change too quickly in the investment world for that approach to work [following some simple rules]. It is necessary instead to understand the rationale behind the rule in order to appreciate why they work when they do and don’t when they don’t.” Understanding the rationale behind the rules ensures success. p. xv
        • In order to really understand the rule and the premise behind them an appreciation of history is required. Such an appreciation is not for the purpose of linking disparate events together. Instead, the purpose is to learn the underlying actions and reactions that create the market rules we’re forced to adhere to today.
  • Buy Low and a lot, Sell High and buy very little
    • When prices are high risk very little capital, when prices are low risk a large amount of capital. p. xvi
        • Our allocation model states that we only buy, at the most, 5 companies when fully invested. We only buy after reviewing stocks that have reached a new low and have been thoroughly assessed. We only target the companies that have increased their dividend every year for a minimum 10 years in a row or are quality companies that are a part of required mutual fund purchases, like Nasdaq 100 stocks.
  • Avoid Market Fads (i.e. investment products)
    • The important point is not merely that junk bonds were flawed (although they certainly were) but that investors must learn from this very avoidable debacle to escape the next enticing market fad that will inevitably come along." Avoid market fads and fashions. p. xvii
        • Yield chasing and investing out of convenience ultimately doesn’t end nicely. Right now the current fad is towards stocks and funds that pay high yields. Inevitably, Wall Street will provide or create products that meet the highest demand. This will result in exceptional yields with exceptional risk. Another market fad that has existed for a long time is the belief in mutual funds and related products (ETFs, index funds, etc). These are instruments of convenience that takes the investor away from learning as they invest. The cumulative effect is that those who participate in instruments of convenience don’t accrue the “true” knowledge necessary to succeed in investing which makes them ripe for falling for the latest fad.
  • Speculation equals Opportunities
    • Speculators “…actions often inadvertently result in the creation of opportunities for value investors.” p. xvii
        • Speculators are often seen as the scrouges of the financial markets who create mayhem on whatever product they touch. However, successful speculators, of which there are few, usually quit while they’re ahead. Unsuccessful speculators, of which there are many, overreach and lose big or lose small frequently enough that the result is the same either way. The loses incurred by speculators ultimately result in the sale or disposition of assets at or below value. Value investors should be alarmed when they hear politicians clamoring for blood at the hands of speculators because many investment opportunities are created at the hands of willing sellers, typically speculators.
  • Rapid Rise and Fall
    • The rapid rise and fall of prices on a daily basis cannot possibly reflect the change in earnings on a quarterly basis. p. xviii
      • What seems most interesting is that some stocks fall in price as though there was a loss in quarterly earnings. A loss in earnings isn’t the same as earning less than expected. Some amusement is garnered from watching “investors” sell a stock simply because the company didn’t earn as much as expected. In certain instances, the rapid decline of a stock may present an opportunity to buy a stock at a reasonable price.

 Margin of Safety-Chapter 1

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