Category Archives: speed resistance line

Clean Harbors (CLH): Downside Targets

On February 9, 2012, when the stock was trading at $64.28, we reviewed the Speed Resistance Lines for Clean Harbors (CLH).  At that time we indicated the Clean Harbors had the following downside targets (found here):

  • $43.53
  • $31.00
  • $22.53

Currently, Clean Harbors (CLH) has declined to the $54.80 level which, in our view, happens to be a critical support level for shareholders of the stock.  As can be seen in the chart below, the price of CLH fell below the 200-day moving average (red line) on June 1, 2012.  Additionally, on three occasions the price of CLH attempted and failed to exceed the 200-day moving average (red line).

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CLH is now bouncing along the support level of $55 (blue line).  It is not clear whether the stock is going to retest the 200-day moving average which presently sits at $61.94.  However, any additional decline in the stock price will likely lead to falling to $47.83.

Considering the Downside Prospects for Apple

For the New Low Observer team, it has been an uneventful period in our watch of Apple Inc. (AAPL) stock since February 5, 2012 even though the price has risen nearly 40%.  What in the world would we consider eventful in regards to Apple stock? Well, we’d  like to see Apple hit one of Edson Gould’s speed resistance line downside targets.  The chart below is an update of the one that we submitted earlier this year (found here).

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The new downside targets are as follows:

  • $424.15
  • $297.43
  • $212.08

Based on the current run in Apple Inc. stock, the Dow Theory fair value is $275.44. (636.23-85.35)/2=275.44

As we said on February 5, 2012, “the rampant enthusiasm for AAPL suggests that the stock isn’t likely to decline to the indicated levels any time soon.” This has definitely been the case with the impressive run up since the beginning of the year.

In order to diffuse the legitimate claims that we’re grasping at straws simply to make a bearish case against Apple Inc., we’ve provided the price performance of the stock over a similar 7-year period from December 19, 2000 to December 31, 2007 applying Edson Gould’s speed resistance lines, in the chart below.

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What stands out the most in the period from 2000-2007 is the percentage increase in Apple’s stock price compared to the current run-up as indicated below:

  • 12/19/2000-12/31/2007: +2,300.67%
  • 9/7/2005-4/13/2012: +1,079.56%

If we were to ask the question of what was the likelihood of Apple falling to $133.22 on December 31, 2007, we believe the chorus of Apple investors would say, “not likely, if ever.”  Similarly, we believe that, based on the current speed resistance lines, no one would expect Apple to decline to our conservative downside target of $424 let alone falling to the  $212.08 worst case price.

We’re not advocating that we’ve seen the peak in Apple’s stock price especially when we compare the fundamental data on AAPL between the 2007 peak and the current price:

Apple (AAPL) 2007 2012 % change
Sales per share 27.52 170.2 +518.45
‘‘Cash Flow’’ per share 4.37 46.5 +964.07
Earnings per share 3.93 43.8 +1,014.50
Div’ds Decl’d per share 0 2.65 N/A
Cap’l Spending per share 0.84 5.65 +572.62
Book Value per share 16.66 138.85 +733.43
Common Shs Outst’g 872.33 940 +7.76
P/E Ratio @ high price 43.53 17.23 -60.42
Source: Value Line Investment Survey Oct. 12, 2007 April 6, 2012

However, in 2007, it was justified for a non-dividend paying technology company to have a P/E ratio in the 40’s while a company that could easily become a dividend aristocrat would be considered fairly priced with a P/E ratio of 17.

Since we believe that markets are supremely inefficient, the perceived extremes to the upside are likely to be counteracted to the downside.  Edson Gould’s speed resistance lines provide a progressive downside target as Apple’s price increases.  If the price decline achieves any of the downside targets, we’ll be ready to re-examine the company fundamentals for long and short-term investment opportunities.

Diamond Foods and Speed Resistance Lines

In retrospect, everything appears “oh so clear.”  We love history and attempt to interpret events from the past as a means to project into the future, assuming everything remains the same. Which is why the chart below seems so stunning to us.

The above chart of Diamond Foods (DMND), which has recently been blown out the water due to some accounting “irregularities” and the dismissal of the CEO and CFO, demonstrates the seeming power of Edson Gould’s speed resistance lines (SRL).  First, notice that the high of DMND was at$96.13, the starting point for all analysis of SRLs.  Based on the high of $96.13, the conservative downside target would have been the $48.47 level.  At the same time, the extreme downside target would have been the $21.00 level with an intermediate downside target of $32.04.

Amazingly, every downside target has been met with DMND reaching as low as $21.44 , on an intraday low.  By the way, little mention has been made of the accounting firm that signed off on Diamond Foods spurious books.

Already, in our prior work, we’ve seen a Netflix (NFLX) SRL, done in December 2010, give us an extreme downside target of $66.  Almost a year later, NFLX declined through the $66 level to fall to as low as $62.37 on November 30, 2011.  Another SRL that we ran before it came to fruition was Green Mountain Coffee Roasters(GMCR) on October25, 2011.  At the time, GMCR was trading at $64.75.  We estimated, using the SRL, that GMCR had an extreme downside target of $37.21.  The stock recently fell as low as $39.42 as reviewed in our February2, 2012 posting.

Below is the latest speed resistance lines for a stock that we’ve been curious about for some time, Clean Harbors (CLH).

Some could reasonably argue that we’re allowing correlation to equal causation, which we’d gladly confess to.  However, this explains why we a reactively seeking companies which we can run Edson Gould’s SRLs beforehand to ensure some semblance of integrity in the concept.  We want to run this examination through as many companies as we can before the actual decline.

A word of warning, the fact that a stock reaches the extreme downside target does not necessarily mean that the stock or index is considered to be a “buy.” Nor does it suggest that the stock or index cannot fall further.  Instead, it only reflects what potentially could happen on the downside.  Additionally, SRLs do not suggest a time frame that a decline is expected to occur.

For the NLO team, speed resistance lines appeal to our sense of considering the worst case scenario, which has saved us a lot of money simply by avoiding situations that would create significant loss.  Using history to assist us in projecting the downside risk is the primary reason we started examining speed resistance lines.

More about SRLs here

Netflix and Speed Resistance Lines

In a February 9, 1970 Barron’s article titled “600 on the Dow?” William X. Scheinman provides an interesting chart of the Dow Industrials (DJI) that outlines what he believes to be the target level that the DJI would fall to before rebounding. This analysis included macro economic analysis that supported the reasons why the Dow was expected to go to 600.

What is most compelling in Scheinman’s analysis is the accuracy of the target level that the DJI was expected to reach. An element that leaves some unanswered questions is that Scheinman had predicted that the DJI would reach 600 within the same year that the article was written. Of course, The DJI didn’t reach 600 until 1974. This has to do with Scheinman’s cycle analysis which is separate and distinct from the topic which we will examine. Being aware of this inconsistency and leaving it aside for the time being, we’ve attempted to understand the rational and methodology of how Scheinman was able to arrive at 600 on the DJI when it was trading at 755.68.

Scheinman indicates that he obtained his method for accurately predicting the level of the DJI from Edson Gould. According to Scheinman, Gould used what is known as the 1/3 speed resistance line measurement to gauge price change and elapsed time which was purported to be two key determinants of crowd psychology in the market. Scheinman goes on to say:


“Resistance lines decline or ascend at one-third or two-thirds the rates of actual declines and advances between significant bottoms and tops. Resistance to advance or decline is frequently encountered at such trendlines; however, if the resistance line is decisively penetrated, the price-action often tends to accelerate in the direction of the penetration.”
In an example provided by Scheinman below, he plots the bull market of the DJI from 1949 to 1970. In that chart, we can see that the dashed line, the one-third speed resistance line, intersects with the 600 level on the DJI.

As far as we can tell, the 1/3 speed resistance line is calculated by dividing the peak of the market move by 3.  To be as conservative as possible, we’ve added the 1/3 speed resistance figure to the low of the first major decline in the bull run.  In this case, the first major low in the bull market from 1949 to 1966 was at the 1953 low of DJI 254.  The peak is indicated to be 1001 (1001/3=333.66).  Then we add 333.66 to 254 arriving at a figure of 587.66.  In order to account for the extremes, we assume that 1/3 the peak is the point at which the market finally settles.  In this case, 1/3 of the peak value is 333.66.  We feel that the conservative and extreme values help to establish a range which a market or stock that has had a near parabolic rise will finally settle at or near. 

According to our calculations for the market run from 1949 to 1966, 587.66 and 333.66 were the conservative and extreme downside targets for the market, respectively.  However, in the article, Scheinman says that the potential worst-case scenario level would be 597.61.  For the most part, Scheinman’s estimate was fairly accurate in terms of where the reversal in the market occurred.  The bottom in the stock market took place on December 9, 1974 at the 579.94 level.

In the chart of the Dow from 1945 to 1976 below, it should be noted that a large amount of “overshooting” of the 1/3 speed resistance line occurred when the low did take place in 1974 instead of 1970 as predicted by Scheinman.  In the case of the Dow, the index overshot the 1/3 speed resistance line in 1974 by 15%.  However, the price was well within the established, albeit wide, range of 587.66 to 333.66.

We decided to see how consistent the 1/3 speed resistance line would be if applied to three different situations.  First, we’ll review the bull market in the Dow Industrials (DJI) from 1982 to 2007. Next, we’ll run this model using the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) from the bear market bottom of 2001 to the present.  Finally, we’re going to see how this model works against Netflix (NFLX), a member of the Nasdaq 100, in a real-time example.

In the case of the bull market run from 1982 to 2007, we divided the peak of the market at 14,164 by 3 and arrived at 4721.33.  We then added 4721.33 to the first major low in the market after the beginning of the bull market which was in 1987 at 1738.74.  The sum of the two figures is 6460.07 for the conservative and 4721.33 for the extreme scenarios. 

When we review the actual bottom in the DJI in 2009 of 6547.05 we can see that the difference between the most conservative estimate and the 2009 low was off by 86.98 points.  There is no instance of the DJI overshooting the 1/3 speed resistance line.  Although coming within 1.5% of an estimated target seems exceptional, the real challenge becomes, would an investor commit money to an investment before the price level actually hits a projected target?  Once invested, could an investor stomach a further decline of 27% or more? [(6460.07-4721.33)/6460.07=26.92%]

In the case of the bull market run in the XAU Index, we divided the peak of the index at 206.37 in 2008 by 3 and arrived at 68.79.  We then added 68.79 to the first major low in the index after the beginning of the bull run, which was at 49.83 on November 19, 2001.  The sum of the two figures is 118.62.  When we contrast the difference between the two numbers, 118.62 and the actual low of 65.72, we see that conservative estimate was accomplished, however a further decline of 45% to below the extreme level was established instead.  Reasonably near the extreme end of the range, but who is willing to hold on after a 45% drop?
Finally, in reviewing the chart pattern of Netflix (NFLX), we have the peak of NFLX at $298.73.  The conservative estimate for the stock is that it would fall to $148 which has already taken place.  The extreme downside target would be $99.58.  Because of the nature of the rise, we believe that Netflix (NFLX) is slated to fall at least to the $99.58 level. 
If for any reason investors become interested in buying Netflix (NFLX), the ideal time to do it appears to be at a price at or below $99.58.  However, the difficulty may be that the sentiment that pushed the stock price to $298.73 would likely be just the opposite to push the price down.  Only time will tell whether Netflix is going to conform to technical patterns created by Edson Gould.
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