Category Archives: Citigroup

Consequences of Falling Oil Prices

Economic events never occur in a vacuum.  Usually there is a string of events that leads from one event to another. One big event can lead to an even bigger event that overshadows the prior calamities that triggered “The Big” event.  The February 9, 1983 issue of Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letters covers  one market event that led to two major crises that happened at different periods in time.  The two events are joined at the hip based on the decline of oil prices.  This led two separate major bailouts that resulted in the structural shift in the way our brand of capitalism works.

The first event resulted in the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L Crisis) and is thought to have begun in 1986 due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 culminating in the bailout of many banks and the eventual bankruptcy of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).

The second event resulted in the Mexican Peso Crisis with the outcome that major banking institutions like Citibank and Goldman Sachs needed to be bailed out.  It is important to note that the Peso Crisis is considered to be as a result of the peso devaluation in 1994.

The true roots of both the S&L Crisis and the Peso Crisis is the decline of oil prices after the inflationary peak in 1980-1981.  Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letter Issue 854 highlights the seeds of destruction that were going to be much larger than even Russell could have imagined. However, if anyone wishes to understand how the snowball got rolling then this issue highlights the beginning.

The very first quote is an amazing insight of the American dependence of the high price of oil, Richard Russell says the following:

“We’re facing a situation (ironically) where the US is all for holding oil prices at a high level. The banks have lent huge sums of money both to private corporations and to oil producing nations-loans based on rising oil prices. If the oil price cracks badly,  the banks are going to have major problems. On top of that, the US depends on oil taxes (so called “excess profits” tax) for huge chunks of tax income. If oil prices crack then the profits for the oil companies will dive (which they are already doing) and the tax short-fall will be horrendous. (page 1)”

This commentary is staggering in the fact that it was so prescient.  The cracks in the armor of the American oil industry began in Texas when the easy money stopped raining down on oil dependent cities like Houston and Dallas.  In a 1988 issue of Dow Theory Letters, Russell had the following to say:

“With oil prices caving in, Texas now has more people leaving the state than coming in.( Dow Theory Letters. March 9, 1988. page 6.)”

The decline in oil prices led to a decline of jobs for that industry which resulted in a decline in real estate prices as people left the state of Texas.  Loans made by savings and loan institutions in the southwest U.S., to businesses and real estate investors, all went bad at the same time leading to the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L Crisis).  The S&L Crisis cost several hundreds of billions of dollars and still exist as an off-budget item as part of our national debt.

The decline in the price of oil also crushed foreign economies dependent on the commodity.  The Mexican Peso Crisis, although officially listed as beginning in 1994, had its roots in the early 1980’s.  The natural outcome of this crisis was the bailout of large banking institutions like Citibank and Goldman Sachs when the government stepped in and bought the bad debt held by the bank’s all in gamble.

Likewise, the current boom in commodity rich countries (although somewhat cooler at present) like Australia, Brazil, Russia, China and India could experience significant shocks to their system depending on the level of loans made as “investments” by foreign banking institutions based on the potential of future growth.

Few understood or believed the impact and importance of high oil prices to the American economy at the time.  Even fewer understood the direct reliance of the U.S. government to high oil prices.  Investors should watch for the potential fallout that may arise from the recent precipitous decline in the price of oil.  The troubles afflicting Russia and Brazil’s Petrobras may be early indications of where the pain may be felt.

Richard Russell Review: Letter 854

Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letter Issue 854 was published on February 9, 1983.  At the time, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was at the 1,067.42 level.

image

Economic events never occur in a vacuum.  Usually there is a string of events that leads from one event to another. One big event can lead to an even bigger event that overshadows the prior calamities that triggered the “big” event.  This issue of Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letters covers  one market event that led to major crises that happened at different periods in time.  The two events are joined at the hip based on the decline of oil prices.  This led two separate major bailouts that resulted in structural shift in the way our brand of capitalism works.

Also, this Russell review will cover the topic of cycles in corporate cash and corporate indebtedness. We'll discuss, in brief, where we might be in this cycle.

The first event resulted in the Savings and Loan Crisis and is thought to have begun in 1986 due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 culminating in the bailout of many banks and the eventual bankruptcy of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).

The second event resulted in the Mexican Peso Crisis with the outcome that major banking institutions like Citibank and Goldman Sachs needed to be bailed out.  It is important to note that the Peso Crisis is considered to be as a result of the peso devaluation in 1994.

The true roots of both the S&L Crisis and the Peso Crisis is the decline of oil prices after the inflationary peak in 1980-1981.  Richard Russell’s Dow Theory Letter Issue 854 highlights the seeds of destruction that were going to be much larger than even Russell could have imagined. However, if anyone wishes to understand how the snowball got rolling then this issue highlights the beginning.

The very first quote is an amazing insight of the American dependence of the high price of oil, Richard Russell says the following:

“We’re facing a situation (ironically) where the US is all for holding oil prices at a high level. The banks have lent huge sums of money both to private corporations and to oil producing nations-loans based on rising oil prices. If the oil price cracks badly,  the banks are going to have major problems. On top of that, the US depends on oil taxes (so called “excess profits” tax) for huge chunks of tax income. If oil prices crack then the profits for the oil companies will dive (which they are already doing) and the tax short-fall will be horrendous. (page 1)”

This commentary is staggering in the fact that it was so prescient.  The cracks in the armor of the American oil industry began in Texas when the easy money stopped raining down on oil dependent cities like Houston and Dallas.  In a 1988 issue of Dow Theory Letters, Russell had the following to say:

“With oil prices caving in, Texas now has more people leaving the state than coming in.( Dow Theory Letters. March 9, 1988. page 6.)”

The decline in oil prices led to a decline of jobs for that industry which resulted in a decline in real estate prices as people left the state of Texas.  Loans made by savings and loan institutions in the southwest U.S., to businesses and real estate investors, all went bad at the same time leading to the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L Crisis).  The S&L Crisis cost several hundreds of billions of dollars and still exist as an off-budget item as part of our national debt.

The decline in the price of oil also crushed foreign economies dependent on the commodity.  The Mexican Peso Crisis, although officially listed as beginning in 1994, had its roots in the early 1980’s.  The natural outcome of this crisis was the bailout of large banking institutions like Citibank and Goldman Sachs when the government stepped in and bought the bad debt held by the bank’s all in gamble.

Likewise, the current boom in commodity rich countries (although somewhat cooler at present) like Australia, Brazil, Russia, China and India could experience significant shocks to their system depending on the level of loans made as “investments” by foreign banking institutions based on the potential of future growth.

Few understood or believed the impact and importance of high oil prices to the American economy at the time.  Even fewer understood the direct reliance of the U.S. government to high oil prices.  Then as now, the elevated level of the price of gold is being wagered on by the U.S. government in a similar way that it was done when we had high prices in oil.  The excessive printing of money through quantitative easing and other accommodative policies by the Federal Reserve is based on the elevated level in gold prices.

If the price of gold were to collapse then all bets are off.  Unfortunately, many believe that a collapse in gold couldn’t happen while the government is bent on printing money out of thin air.  However, the problem is that commodities like gold are prone to dramatic declines, especially when all bets are that it can’t or won’t happen.

Many die-hard gold investors/speculators are not making the connection between the government’s reliance and expectation of higher prices in gold.  Worse still, gold investors mistakenly believe that the U.S. government wants to see a lower price in gold and that the only direction is up due to accommodative policies.  This is far from the reality, as found out the hard way by the likes of billionaire money manager John Paulson.  Waiting in the wings are other big-time money managers who will likely get bailed out of their money losing bets on gold’s elevated levels.  Those that have leveraged their bets on gold and other commodities will be bailed out using taxpayers money and hidden as an off-budget items as part of the national debt.  Suffice to say, despite all the carnage in the period from 1980 to 2007, the stock market managed to climb over 12 times.

Next up is a comment on how U.S. corporations were strapped with debt. Russell says the following:

“In the shorter term, the argument for holding stocks is that a low rate of inflation will be bullish for stocks. But that argument was never used in a situation like the current one - a situation in which corporations are loaded with debt.  Whether these corporations can survive with debt ridden structure during a period of deflation remains to be seen. (page 3)”

This commentary is interesting because it was at the early stages of a secular bull market when the Dow Jones Industrial Average went from 1,000 to the peak of 14,164, an increase of over 12 times in 24 years (and this was just the “average”).  Now, we seem to be in the early stages of a secular bear market with just the opposite scenario.  Today, we’re being told of the immense cash hoard that corporations happen to be sitting on (WSJ article here).  Furthermore, interest rates are at or near zero and likely to rise as opposed to rates falling from double digit heights in 1980.

We’re not impressed with the claims of corporate strength based on off-shore cash hoards. We believe that what we’re witness to is the corporate equivalent of high tide which is inevitably going to be followed by low tide.  It is only a matter of time that it will be revealed that the idle cash of today will be the debt-laden corporation of tomorrow.  Those that are clamoring (in some cases suing) for companies to disgorge their coffers of excess cash in the form of “special” dividends will not think twice, twenty years from now, that they had unwittingly contributed to the decline of the company that they’ve targeted.

Considering the Crisis at Bank of America

As a former NLO dividend watch list stock, Bank of America (BAC) has fallen on hard times that in many respects were predestined.  In a posting titled Financial Panic Chronicles dated May 9, 2009, we pointed out the similarities of the October 1929 forced merger between Austria’s number two bank BodenKreditAnstalt with number one ranked CreditAnastalt and the forced mergers between Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo/Wachovia, and J.P. Morgan/Bear Stearns in 2008.
Our point of making the comparison between distinctly different institutions in different eras was to show what the hazards might be when an ailing bank isn’t allowed to fail.  It was only two years after the merger of BodenKreditAnstalt with CreditAnstalt that the remaining “super bank”, CreditAnstalt, collapsed which resulted in the worldwide banking crisis. 
The failure of CreditAnstalt in 1931 did not arrive without a fight. F.M. Rothschild committed enormous amounts of money from 1930 to 1931 in an effort to use his name and financial largess to sway public opinion of the health of CreditAnstalt, not unlike Warren Buffett’s most recent “investment” in Bank of America.  As noted in our previous article:

London banks, the Bank of England, Germany's Reichsbank, Bank for International Settlement and the Bank of Austria all threw money at CreditAnstalt starting in May of 1930 in a failed attempt to shore up the problem.

 The current travails of Bank of America (BAC) and Citigroup (C) may prove too enormous for market forces to bear.  Talk of possible capital raises and divesting individual units through bankruptcy speak largely of the dire risk to the banking system the zombie banks pose.  Bank of America, in particular, through “too big to fail” policies has become THE bank of America.
We wouldn’t be surprised if Bank of America, or another of the current top ten banks in the U.S., in an effort to stave off certain failure, will be partially or fully nationalized as CreditAnstalt before its collapse.  However, such actions will only demonstrate for the investing public that band-aids should not be used to deal with hemorrhages.
Because we rely heavily upon the markets to tell us what the investing public believes will come next, we are presenting the Dow Theory downside targets for Bank of America.
According to Dow’s Theory, the following are the long-term downside targets for Bank of America (BAC):
  • $18.59
  • $13.44 (1/3)
  • $10.865 (fair value)
  • $8.29 (2/3)
  • $3.14 (3/3)
Already, BAC has managed to decline below the 2/3 resistance level of $8.29 per share.  This typically indicates that Bank of America stock will go to $3.14 (3/3 resistance level).  In four prior peak-to-trough periods since 1982, Bank of America has managed to fall close to, or below, the previous low three times as demonstrated in our September 15, 2008 Dow Theory analysis of the stock.
Because we don’t want to assume that the Bank of America will automatically go to the prior low of $3.14, we have provided short-term Dow Theory targets for BAC.
Dow Theory on the $8.29 to $3.14 price levels ($1.73):
  • $8.29
  • $6.65
  • $5.72
  • $4.83
  • $3.14
 
These targets are in hopes that the stock does not actually go below $3.14. Already, Bank of America has fallen below the $6.65 level leaving only $5.72 and $4.83 as possible support levels before the bank reaches $3.14.
If the voting machine known as the stock market continues on its current downward trajectory, any decline of BAC below $3.14 would require nationalization in the “best” case scenario.  The worst case scenario might reveal that safety nets like FDIC insurance are the root cause of how our financial system got to where we are today.  In the words of Citigroup (formerly National City) when FDIC was first proposed:

"The element of character in the choice of bank is eliminated, and the competitive appeal is shifted to other and lower standards, such as liberality in making loans. The natural result is that the standards of management are lowered, bankers may take greater risks for the sake of larger profits and the economic loss which accompanies bad bank management increases."
Grant, James. Mr. Market Miscalculates. Axios Press. 2008. page 202.

Our focus on the merger of BodenKreditAnstalt and CreditAnstalt in 1929 and the subsequent failure in 1931 that led to a worldwide banking crisis should give good reason for all individuals to be concerned.  The safety nets that were created as an outgrowth of failure of the banking system are not prepared to handle what may come if the perception grows that Bank of America needs to be nationalized.

Flash Crash Follies

Flash Crash Follies is a running tally of stocks that get ensnared by regulations as an outgrowth of the May 6, 2010 "flash crash."  While the explosive crash of stocks (either up or down) on the NYSE is a symptom to a bigger problem, we want to chronicle what was never reported to have happened before May 6, 2010.  Action packed moves in the price of stocks that will bring pleasure, pain and finally resignation at the state of the free market as we know it. 
We've added commentary from the mouthpiece of the NYSE or NASDAQ to explain away "erroneous" trades or canceled orders.  Before long we're going to hear politicians getting into the fray on specific "erroneous" trades.  What will this devolve into nobody knows for sure.  However, we're willing to bet that in due time, the treatment of the symptom will become a distinct problem of its own.

"...the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations." Adam Smith

September 28, 2010 (date contains Bloomberg screen shots from third party source)
Apple (AAPL), Research In Motion (RIMM), IBM (IBM), Dell (DELL), General Electric (GE), Oracle (ORCL), Microsoft (MSFT), Hewlett-Packard (HPQ)
Stocks of the above noted companies took a dive at the same time on September 28, 2010.  The exchanges didn't provide commentary on the actions taken as a result of the instantaneous decline and rise in value.  many have attributed specific declines to "newsworthy" issues related to the specific companies.  However, no one has stepped forward to explain the statistical anomally of so many companies experiencing the same issue at exactly the same time.

July 29, 2010 (date contains article link from third party source)
Cisco Corp. (CSCO)
At 10:41am EST, Cisco (CSCO) shares spiked by 11% due to an order imbalanced triggered by 100 shares.  CSCO rose from $23.37 to $26 which triggered circuit breakers prompting Jamie Selway, managing director at broker White Cap Trading LLC in New York, “We’re stopping trading in incomparably liquid products because of dumb mistakes...”  In this instance, the NYSE-owned AMEX which handles very few trades in CSCO could not fulfill orders placed on their exchange even through there were plenty of shares being trades on alternative exchanges.  Ultimately, CSCO was trading with the liquidity of a penny stock.  Soon enough, firms with intimate knowledge of where they place their trade can play the illiquidity to their advantage.  The AMEX and other small exchanges will be under attack.

July 23, 2010 (date contains article link from third party source)
Genzyme Corp. (GENZ)
At 1:18pm EST and 1:25pm EST, Genzyme Corp. (GENZ) triggered circuit breakers when the stock attempted to rise by more than 10% on two separate occasions within the same day due to rumors about a takeover. Nasdaq OMX spokesman Robert Madden gave no justification for the halt in trading. However, traders and money managers expressed the sentiment that “at some point, you need to let efficient market theory rule how stocks trade.” In this case, Genzyme wasn't allowed to rise as much as speculators were willing to bid the price up.

July 6, 2010 (date contains article link from third party source)
Anadarko Petroleum (APC)
At 10:56am EDT to 11:01am EDT, Anadarko shares trade from $39.14 to $99,999.99. “‘We are still learning from the experience,’ he [Ray Pellechia] said.”
June 29, 2010  (date contains article link from third party source)
Citigroup (C)
At 1:03pm EDT, Citigroup shares trade from $3.80 to $3.3174 or down 12.7%. “The erroneous trade was subsequently canceled, NYSE spokesman Ray Pellechia said.”

June 16, 2010 (date contains article link from third party source)
Washington Post (WPO)
At 3:07pm EDT Washington Post stock trades from $450 to $919 or up 104%. All trades were cancelled. “‘What happened today was not due to a substantive, true move in the stock. It was simply an error,’ NYSE spokesman Ray Pellechia said.”
 
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The Anatomy of a Bear Market Trade

One Investment Observation that we made is worth reviewing because it encompasses many fundamental techniques necessary for accounting for risk in bear markets. Our recommendation of Bank of Hawaii (BOH) on January 12, 2009 at the price of $37.76 is a prime example of risk adjusted investing. We’d like to think that this was among the boldest and well-planned recommendations that we’ve done. In this analysis, we’ll point out the specific elements that made this Investment Observation so unique.

First and foremost, the recommendation of a bank would seem to be completely out of left field for us since we have always intentionally shied away from the banking sector. Making our recommendation more usual was the fact that we were in the midst of a literal and figurative collapse in the banking industry. In January of 2009, it was hard to tell where the fire wasn’t going to spread next. After all, if you’d seen Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, and Lehman go off the deep end, who is to say that other regional banks weren’t next? However, to see such a well-run institution like BOH closing in on a new low was very hard to resist.

A favorite default reaction for a stock that is near a new low is to look at Value Line Investment Survey for a specific piece of information. In the legend box provided by Value Line, it indicates the most reliable measure of historical mean price that the stock trades at. Sometimes that measure is based on cash flow, earnings, earnings divided by interest rate, book value etc. Regardless of the measure, Value Line’s estimated mean value is quite reliable. If the stock is above or below the mean figure it helps provide a target that we can expect the price to revert to at some point in the future. The quality of the mean figure hinges on the quality of the stock. If for some reason there doesn’t seem to be any consistency in the Value Line estimate then we discard it outright and only use Dow Theory’s fair value as the substitute mean. However, we have found the Value Line estimate to be reasonably reliable for the majority of stocks that we track.

In our assessment of Bank of Hawaii, Value Line indicated that the mean price for BOH was 14 times earnings. At the time, full year 2008 trailing earnings were at $4.06. We only use full year trailing earnings; estimates of the future are not accepted unless they are lower than the previous full year’s data. The figures provided by Value Line gave us a mean price of $56.84 for where we could expect the price of Bank of Hawaii to eventually revert to. Depending on the quality of the company, our dreams are fulfilled if the stock in question goes back to the mean. This is also in accordance with Dow’s Theory that all stocks tend to gravitate to their fair value.

In terms of Dow Theory, we indicated that there were three downside targets. From our analysis of previous Dow Theory moves, we indicated that Bank of Hawaii demonstrated the capacity to retrace “…from the peak to between the 2nd and 3rd retracement levels…” This led us to believe that a purchase of the stock might be required “…between $30.70 and $20.87.” The actual lowest point reached on a closing basis for Bank of Hawaii on March 9, 2009 was $25.70. This was $0.08 less than the exact middle of $30.70 and $20.87.

Our next point of reference was if we were forced to hold the stock for “the long term.” Using this perspective, we surmised that Bank of Hawaii would have to be held for 15 years “...to recoup all [or some] that you have initially invested if you reinvest the dividends.” This is a big leap of faith considering that the dividend could be cut at any time. However, because BOH had demonstrated a consistent history of increasing dividends for over 30 years, it warranted the benefit of the doubt on this matter.

Since the stock price of Bank of Hawaii had been in a rising trend for an extended period of time it was difficult to gain new insight from looking at the chart. However, what we did notice was the surge in volume of shares traded when the stock was nearing a low. Given this pattern, we said:

“All we need now is a good collapse in the price to reassure us of the opportunity to buy. That opportunity might come in the wake of BOH falling below the 52-week low of $36.32 reached on November 21, 2008.”

Shortly afterwards, the stock price experienced an even greater surge in the volume which was accompanied by a steep decline. As mentioned before, Bank of Hawaii (BOH) had a closing low price of $25.70. Being tepid on the idea of holding a stock longer than necessary, we issued a sell recommendation on August 6, 2009.

Under the following scenarios, investor gains would have varied greatly if:

  • bought at the observed price of $37.76 and sold on the recommended sell date, the gain would have been 19.47% on an annualized basis.
  • bought at the low of $25.70 and sold at the top, the annualized gain would be 54%
  • bought at the observed price of $37.76 and held to the present, the approximate gain would be 10.40% on an annualized basis.

Although we outlined exactly what eventually happened, we could never take credit for actually buying at the bottom and selling at the exact top. However, we can show that our ballpark estimates for Bank of Hawaii (BOH) reaching the mean price was fairly accurate. The peak in the price at $53.53 was within 6.18% of our price target of $56.84. Our estimated time to buy the stock between $30.70 and $20.87 was met with a closing low of $25.70 or $0.08 off of the exact middle of the two price points. Finally, we were able to usurp the 4.80% dividend yield by selling the stock with an annualized gain of 19%. We didn’t have to hold the stock “for the long term” to realize such opportunities.

Naturally, there are some critics who suggest that hiding behind “quality” stocks is only a ruse to speculate rather than invest. We understand and grapple with this consideration constantly. We know that most market commentators in the media lionize “The Warren Buffett Way” and vilify traders. Other critics might argue that if we “knew” so much then why didn’t we recommend Citigroup (C) or Bank of America (BAC)? However, our goal was, and always will be, to determine the lowest risk way to invest in the stock market with the widest margin for error with an annualized gain of 10% on each investment.

Citigroup (C) Continues to Struggle

Below is a second look at an article that I published back in November 2008. This lays bare the extent of the problems faced by Citigroup. I hope anyone interested in Citigroup finds this article helpful. We can only hope that the Citi situation doesn't go the way of CreditAnstalt as described in previous articles. -Touc

The term that is the basis of all discussions in elementary economic modeling, especially when comparing two factors, is ceteris paribus. Ceteris paribus means "with other things the same" and represents the best guess as to what is likely to occur provided all thing remain unchanged. Let us take an overly simplistic view of the situation with Citigroup's government rescue plan and determine the potential outcome ceteris paribus.

According to the Wall Street Journal, in an article by David Enrich, the federal government has agreed to absorb $277 billion of $306 billion of losses that Citigroup has identified as "troubled" assets. Additionally, the Treasury is adding $20 billion on top of the $25 billion recently injected into Citigroup as part of the TARP plan. Remember, the $277 billion is separate from the $700 billion bailout package. Again, this current approach with Citi is counter to the early arguments that there needs to be a comprehensive solution, not an individual approach, to the bailouts after the fall of Fannie, Freddie, Lehman, Merrill and WaMu which spawned the TARP plan to begin with.

Now, let's look at only the off-balance sheet portion of Citigroup. The off-balance sheet portion is called an asset by Citi but isn't included on the books. The off-balance sheet items are valued at $1.23 trillion. I don't know why Citi wouldn't include these items on their balance sheet but if the U.S. government is any indication then the off-balance sheet is probably more like liabilities instead of assets.

If the government is going to front Citi $277 billion (a whopping 40% of the total TARP package for only one company) then that would leave $953 billion remaining on the off-balance sheet portfolio. If we split the $953 billion in half and conservatively assume this portion is "troubled" then we have a figure equal to $476.5 billion. Remember when Merrill Lynch auctioned off $30 billion of CDOs or "troubled" assets back in July 2008? Here's what Bloomberg.com said of that auction on July 29, 2008:

In yesterday's statement, Merrill said it agreed to sell $30.6 billion of collateralized debt obligations -- the mortgage-related bonds that have caused most of the firm's losses -- for $6.7 billion. The buyer is an affiliate of Lone Star Funds, a Dallas-based investment manager.

At the time, Merrill was only able to get $6.7 billion, a loss of 78% or $0.22 cents from every dollar originally invested. Therefore, my assumption of a 50% loss for Citi isn't so far fetched.

Ceteris paribus, this leaves Citi with at least $476.5 billion in losses to write down at some point in the future. This assumes that the economy remains in a slight recession, that earnings are the same, that the dividend for this company has been all but eliminated, that there are no further losses in the housing market. All things being equal, Citi is in for hard times. However, if we take 78% of the entire $953 billion then we get a total loss of $743 billion. A sum exceeding the amount of the entire TARP program even after a $277 billion direct injection to Citi from the government.

Clearly our government under Bush/Obama has severely underestimated the extent of how much damage has been done to our financial system. Along with the lack of knowledge that has been demonstrated, the only policy reaction is to have a blank check approach to dealing with the problem. This is what I meant when I said that chaos will ensue when and if Bank of America falls below $14.00.

Previous articles on Citigroup

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