Monthly Archives: September 2011

Dow Theory: Bear Market Downside Target

On August 2, 2011, we received what is widely understood to be a Dow Theory bear market indication. According to Dow Theory, a bear market indication shall remain in place until counteracted by a bullish indication. The middle ground, where there is not a new bear market confirmation nor a new bull market signal, is generally considered a range or a “line.”

On August 9, 2011, we presented what we believed to be bear market rally targets according to Dow Theory. In the comment section of that same article, we revised the bear market rally targets based on the low of the Dow Industrials set on August 10, 2011.

The first bear market rally target, which seems next to impossible for the Dow Industrials to stay above, is 11,416.80. This level was only the first of five upside targets that would need to be breached for any prospect that a renewed cyclical bull market is in the works.

A confirmation of the bear market would be signaled if the Dow Industrials and Dow Transports were to fall below 10,719.94 and 4,149.94, respectively.

According to Dow Theory, we are still in a bear market and the early unconfirmed indications are that we may be headed to the 9,686.48 level.

Buffett Prepares His Exit

In a Market Watch article title “Buffett’s Berkshire Buyback Part of Exit Plan”, it was announced that Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A) will buy back shares of its Class-A and Class-B shares. In the article, it was also mentioned that “the plan also essentially provides for ‘an unlimited and perpetual program.’” This suggests that the shares of Berkshire Hathaway will continuously be bought under specific conditions.
We’re in perfect agreement that the current plan to repurchase Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-B) stock along with the introduction of a select team of managers is part of the strategy to phase out Warren Buffett’s involvement in the company. However, we think that the most overlooked part of Buffett’s departure plan was the purchase of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI).
For a long time, Warren Buffett has been outspoken against the ownership of airline shares due to “…significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money.” Therefore, it would seem out of character to purchase a company in an industry synonymous for many of the same attributes as airlines. However, the purchase of a railroad company has two significant advantages that are not afforded to most corporations in the United States.
First, a quirk in the rules for railroads allow them to not have to liquidate in bankruptcy, if that were to occur. After Buffett is gone, whoever is in charge can bumble with some derivative instruments that, for unforeseen reasons, blow up. If the blow up were large enough, it could trigger the need to file bankruptcy to get Berkshire Hathaway’s house in order. The clause in the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and Bankruptcy Act allows for railroads not to liquidate if faced with bankruptcy proceedings. This protects Berkshire Hathaway from having to sell off valuable assets while the company re-emerges out of bankruptcy.
The second significant succession strategy of a railroad has to do with what is called “compulsory mergers.” This requirement allows the ICC and a railroad that has gone bankrupt to merge with another company on terms drawn up by the ICC, the bankrupt company and the acquiring company.
Since the railroad industry, like the airline industry, is synonymous for bankruptcy, BRK gets to take advantage of the "compulsory" mergers rule under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. This rule gives the ICC "...control over formulating a plan for the reorganization of an insolvent railroad."
Knowing that bankruptcy is only just around the corner in the next economic purge, Berkshire Hathaway can absorb other rails with absolute impunity. Even better, "...Section 5 of the Commerce Act, which governs mergers of solvent railroads, give the merging carriers primary control over the formulation of a merger plan." Could you imagine structuring your own deal of a merging rail that is going bankrupt?
There is a lot of precedent for these laws in the structuring of many railroads.  In fact,  Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad and Northern Pacific Railway (independent companies before their merger) have had their days with aspects of these rules before merging. Because railroads go bankrupt often, there are many examples of how this works. In one "merger," an acquiring railroad "bought" $1.9 million of claims against the state of Florida at a cost of $5,000 from another railroad facing bankruptcy. In our examination of the topic, we have seen assets worth even more being given away for $0.00 as part of a compulsory merger. 
Because Buffett has been outspoken against the ownership of airline shares due to the general lack of profitability and high propensity to go bankrupt, it seems out of character to purchase a company in an industry synonymous for the same attributes. We believe that Buffett’s purchase of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI) was a critical piece of the succession strategy laid down for the benefit of current and future shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway.

Citations:

  • Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Annual Report. Page 8. 2007 Report here 
  • Altman, Edward I. Predicting Railroad Bankruptcies in America. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 184-211.
  • The Yale Law Journal. "'Compulsory' Mergers under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act". Vol. 64, No. 2 (December 1954). page 282-292
  • Bedingfield, Robert, “Top Officer Quits at Penn Central in Cash Squeeze”, New York Times, June 9, 1970. page 1.
  • Schroeder, Alice. The Snowball. Bantam Books, New York. 2008.

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In the News: September 25, 2011

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Nasdaq 100 Watch List: September 23, 2011

Below are the Nasdaq 100 companies that are within 5% of their respective 52-week lows. Stocks that appear on our watch lists are not recommendations to buy. Instead, they are the starting point for doing your research and determining the best company to buy. Ideally, a stock that is purchased from this list is done after a considerable decline in the price and rigorous due diligence.
Symbol Name Price P/E Div/Shr Yield P/B % from low
TEVA Teva Pharmaceutical 35.26 10.08 0.79 2.10% 1.33 0.74%
ESRX Express Scripts 38.71 15.86 0 0 10.55 0.91%
FISV Fiserv, Inc. 49.65 16.28 0 0 2.27 1.85%
NIHD NII Holdings, Inc. 29.73 12.08 0 0 1.36 2.02%
XRAY DENTSPLY 31.24 16.36 0.2 0.60% 2.13 2.49%
EXPD Expeditors Intl of Was 40.45 23.11 0.5 1.20% 4.52 2.98%
QGEN Qiagen N.V. 13.45 24.45 0 0 1.2 3.07%
VOD Vodafone Group P 25.08 10.72 1.92 7.60% 0.93 3.17%
PCAR PACCAR Inc. 34.06 17.29 0.72 2.00% 2.07 3.21%
NFLX Netflix, Inc. 129.36 32.82 0 0 20.22 3.47%
AMAT Applied Materials 10.59 7.3 0.32 2.90% 1.6 3.93%
URBN Urban Outfitters 23.41 15.85 0 0 2.76 3.95%
PAYX Paychex, Inc. 26.22 18.46 1.24 4.70% 6.27 4.38%
BMC BMC Software, Inc. 38.85 15.34 0 0 4.16 4.46%
RIMM Research In Motion 21.32 3.89 0 0 1.12 4.46%
JOYG Joy Global Inc. 65.01 11.84 0.7 1.00% 3.57 4.52%
INFY Infosys Limited 48.23 17.73 0.85 1.70% 4.33 4.58%
ILMN Illumina, Inc. 41.67 48.12 0 0 4.52 4.65%
VRSN VeriSign, Inc. 28.34 6.32 0 0 N/A 4.96%
Watch List Summary
The following are companies we are tracking from our watch list  this week. First up is Illumina (ILMN) which was last on our watch list on December 19, 2009. After being on our list, Illumina (ILMN) rose 172% at its peak on July 4, 2011. Already ILMN has lost -45.17% since the high in July. While ILMN is still nearly 50% above the December 19, 2009 price, the possibility exists that all the gains that were made could disappear in short order. As an example, anyone who bought ILMN after June 4, 2010 is confronted with a loss. ILMN has a market cap of $5.18B. Levered free cash flow at $146.48 million and enterprise value at $4.75 billion. The stock has lost -47.52% since the high on July 6th and is currently trading at 4.65% above its 52-week low.
Paychex (PAYX) was on our new low watch list on August 15, 2010 when it was within 2% of the 52-week low. Subsequently, Paychex (PAYX) rose 35.80% in 7 months. Employment being what it is, PAYX is trading in a wide range exhibiting a strong base at around $25. According to Value Line, PAYX is trading 30% below the historical fair value. PAYX has no debt and is likely to be an acquisition target if the stock remains at the current price or lower. Already PAYX has fallen 22% from the high set on March 9th bringing the market cap down to $9.49 billion. Prior to 2008, PAYX had a 19-year history of increasing the dividend. Since 2008, the annual dividend has remained at $1.24. PAYX would be purchased at any price below $25.50.
Netflix (NFLX) is going through significant turmoil as reflected in the stock price. Since the high of $298.73, NFLX has plummeted to $129.36 or down -56%. The financials on NFLX are a moving target making it difficult to fully determine the company’s true value. However, the business model is compelling and warrants considerable review. NFLX has a market cap of $6.8 billion and enterprise value of $6.65 billion. After applying Edson Gould’s 1/3 speed resistance line, NFLX will become worth considering at $99.58 and below. A detailed analysis of Gould's speed resistance line applied to NFLX can be found here.
Expeditors International of Washington (EXPD) has fallen to within 2.98% of the 52-week low. According to Yahoo!Finance, EXPD provides logistics services which involves consolidation or forwarding air and ocean freight. EXPD is a highly efficient organization and is trading at 2006 prices as if the company hasn’t averaged earnings of $1.32 in last 4 years compared to average earnings of $0.66 in the period from 2002 to 2005. According to Value Line Investment Survey, EXPD is estimated to have cash flow of $2 for 2011. Historically, EXPD has traded at 25 times cash flow which suggests that the stock should be selling at a fair value of $50. EXPD has increased their dividend every year for the last 18 years.
Watch List Performance Review
The performance of our watch list after one year is to remind us of the possible outcome of investing in the stocks on our list. It is hoped that we can gain greater insight in the investing process and refine that process as we go along. Below is the performance of the top five stocks on our Nasdaq 100 watch list from September 17, 2010.
Symbol Name 2010 2011 % change
PAYX Paychex, Inc. 25.95 26.22 1.04%
INTC Intel Corporation 18.81 22.16 17.81%
AMAT Applied Materials, Inc. 11.02 10.59 -3.90%
YHOO Yahoo! Inc. 13.89 14.71 5.90%
MXIM Maxim Integrated Products 16.91 23.89 41.28%
Avg. 12.43%
NDX Nasdaq 100 Index 1955.83 2206.86 12.83%

All of the top five stocks from last year achieved 25% returns by May 2011.  However, only Maxim Integrated (MXIM) was able to sustain it's price performance that was above the Nasdaq 100 throughout the year.  As a group, the top five fell short of the Nasdaq 100 by -0.40%.

Netflix and Speed Resistance Lines

In a February 9, 1970 Barron’s article titled “600 on the Dow?” William X. Scheinman provides an interesting chart of the Dow Industrials (DJI) that outlines what he believes to be the target level that the DJI would fall to before rebounding. This analysis included macro economic analysis that supported the reasons why the Dow was expected to go to 600.

What is most compelling in Scheinman’s analysis is the accuracy of the target level that the DJI was expected to reach. An element that leaves some unanswered questions is that Scheinman had predicted that the DJI would reach 600 within the same year that the article was written. Of course, The DJI didn’t reach 600 until 1974. This has to do with Scheinman’s cycle analysis which is separate and distinct from the topic which we will examine. Being aware of this inconsistency and leaving it aside for the time being, we’ve attempted to understand the rational and methodology of how Scheinman was able to arrive at 600 on the DJI when it was trading at 755.68.

Scheinman indicates that he obtained his method for accurately predicting the level of the DJI from Edson Gould. According to Scheinman, Gould used what is known as the 1/3 speed resistance line measurement to gauge price change and elapsed time which was purported to be two key determinants of crowd psychology in the market. Scheinman goes on to say:

“Resistance lines decline or ascend at one-third or two-thirds the rates of actual declines and advances between significant bottoms and tops. Resistance to advance or decline is frequently encountered at such trendlines; however, if the resistance line is decisively penetrated, the price-action often tends to accelerate in the direction of the penetration.”
In an example provided by Scheinman below, he plots the bull market of the DJI from 1949 to 1970. In that chart, we can see that the dashed line, the one-third speed resistance line, intersects with the 600 level on the DJI.

As far as we can tell, the 1/3 speed resistance line is calculated by dividing the peak of the market move by 3.  To be as conservative as possible, we’ve added the 1/3 speed resistance figure to the low of the first major decline in the bull run.  In this case, the first major low in the bull market from 1949 to 1966 was at the 1953 low of DJI 254.  The peak is indicated to be 1001 (1001/3=333.66).  Then we add 333.66 to 254 arriving at a figure of 587.66.  In order to account for the extremes, we assume that 1/3 the peak is the point at which the market finally settles.  In this case, 1/3 of the peak value is 333.66.  We feel that the conservative and extreme values help to establish a range which a market or stock that has had a near parabolic rise will finally settle at or near. 

According to our calculations for the market run from 1949 to 1966, 587.66 and 333.66 were the conservative and extreme downside targets for the market, respectively.  However, in the article, Scheinman says that the potential worst-case scenario level would be 597.61.  For the most part, Scheinman’s estimate was fairly accurate in terms of where the reversal in the market occurred.  The bottom in the stock market took place on December 9, 1974 at the 579.94 level.

In the chart of the Dow from 1945 to 1976 below, it should be noted that a large amount of “overshooting” of the 1/3 speed resistance line occurred when the low did take place in 1974 instead of 1970 as predicted by Scheinman.  In the case of the Dow, the index overshot the 1/3 speed resistance line in 1974 by 15%.  However, the price was well within the established, albeit wide, range of 587.66 to 333.66.

We decided to see how consistent the 1/3 speed resistance line would be if applied to three different situations.  First, we’ll review the bull market in the Dow Industrials (DJI) from 1982 to 2007. Next, we’ll run this model using the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (XAU) from the bear market bottom of 2001 to the present.  Finally, we’re going to see how this model works against Netflix (NFLX), a member of the Nasdaq 100, in a real-time example.

In the case of the bull market run from 1982 to 2007, we divided the peak of the market at 14,164 by 3 and arrived at 4721.33.  We then added 4721.33 to the first major low in the market after the beginning of the bull market which was in 1987 at 1738.74.  The sum of the two figures is 6460.07 for the conservative and 4721.33 for the extreme scenarios. 

When we review the actual bottom in the DJI in 2009 of 6547.05 we can see that the difference between the most conservative estimate and the 2009 low was off by 86.98 points.  There is no instance of the DJI overshooting the 1/3 speed resistance line.  Although coming within 1.5% of an estimated target seems exceptional, the real challenge becomes, would an investor commit money to an investment before the price level actually hits a projected target?  Once invested, could an investor stomach a further decline of 27% or more? [(6460.07-4721.33)/6460.07=26.92%]

In the case of the bull market run in the XAU Index, we divided the peak of the index at 206.37 in 2008 by 3 and arrived at 68.79.  We then added 68.79 to the first major low in the index after the beginning of the bull run, which was at 49.83 on November 19, 2001.  The sum of the two figures is 118.62.  When we contrast the difference between the two numbers, 118.62 and the actual low of 65.72, we see that conservative estimate was accomplished, however a further decline of 45% to below the extreme level was established instead.  Reasonably near the extreme end of the range, but who is willing to hold on after a 45% drop?
Finally, in reviewing the chart pattern of Netflix (NFLX), we have the peak of NFLX at $298.73.  The conservative estimate for the stock is that it would fall to $148 which has already taken place.  The extreme downside target would be $99.58.  Because of the nature of the rise, we believe that Netflix (NFLX) is slated to fall at least to the $99.58 level. 
If for any reason investors become interested in buying Netflix (NFLX), the ideal time to do it appears to be at a price at or below $99.58.  However, the difficulty may be that the sentiment that pushed the stock price to $298.73 would likely be just the opposite to push the price down.  Only time will tell whether Netflix is going to conform to technical patterns created by Edson Gould.
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In the News: September 18, 2011

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NLO Dividend Watch List: September 16, 2011

The market rallied everyday this week taking the Dow Jones Industrial Average above the 11,500 mark.  The S&P 500 is back above 1,200 level. In regards to Dow Theory, we believe that the bear market is still intact (see Dow Theory Bear Market stands).  Until both the Industrials and Dow Jones Transports can break above their intermediate high, we believe the market remains very vulnerable.

September 16, 2011 

Symbol Name Price % Yr Low P/E EPS (ttm) Dividend Yield Payout Ratio
ANAT American National Insurance 70.88 1.10% 11.74 6.04 3.08 4.35% 51%
TMP Tompkins Financial Corp. 36.51 2.41% 11.59 3.15 1.44 3.94% 46%
HGIC Harleysville Group Inc.  26.76 3.60% 15.12 1.77 1.52 5.68% 86%
SYY Sysco Corp. 27.4 3.71% 13.98 1.96 1.04 3.80% 53%
BRO Brown & Brown, Inc. 19.01 4.51% 17.28 1.10 0.32 1.68% 29%
PEP PepsiCo Inc. 62.05 4.73% 15.79 3.93 2.06 3.32% 52%
SFNC Simmons First National Corp.  21.8 5.47% 10.48 2.08 0.76 3.49% 37%
GBCI Glacier BanCorp., Inc.  10.64 5.56% 18.67 0.57 0.52 4.89% 91%
ALL Allstate Corp.   24.94 5.59% 23.75 1.05 0.84 3.37% 80%
GD General Dynamics Corp. 60.6 5.59% 8.64 7.01 1.88 3.10% 27%
SYBT S.Y. BanCorp., Inc.  19.4 5.66% 11.21 1.73 0.72 3.71% 42%
VLY Valley National BanCorp.  11.11 5.71% 13.23 0.84 0.69 6.21% 82%
CBSH Commerce Bancshares, Inc.  37.36 5.78% 13.25 2.82 0.92 2.46% 32%
CATO Cato Corp. 24.03 5.86% 10.97 2.19 0.92 3.83% 42%
MMM 3M Co 80.53 5.96% 13.67 5.89 2.20 2.73% 37%
CTBI Community Trust BanCorp., Inc.  24.65 6.02% 10.53 2.34 1.24 5.03% 53%
FRS Frisch's Restaurants, Inc 19.66 6.10% 10.51 1.87 0.64 3.26% 34%
BDX Becton, Dickinson and Co. 77.25 6.19% 12.98 5.95 1.64 2.12% 28%
BXS BanCorp.South Inc. 10.31 6.29% 21.94 0.47 0.04 0.39% 9%
T AT&T Inc 28.94 6.40% 8.41 3.44 1.72 5.94% 50%
CFR Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 48.98 6.43% 13.88 3.53 1.84 3.76% 52%
NTRS Northern Trust Corp.  37 6.69% 14.68 2.52 1.12 3.03% 44%
DOV Dover Corp. 52.34 6.71% 11.45 4.57 1.26 2.41% 28%
SJW SJW Corp. 22.31 6.80% 16.77 1.33 0.69 3.09% 52%
BRK-A Berkshire Hathaway Inc. CL 'A' 107100 6.82% 14.36 7457.95 N/A N/A N/A
TR Tootsie Roll Industries Inc  24.89 7.01% 28.94 0.86 0.32 1.29% 37%
MDP Meredith Corp. 24.28 7.05% 8.73 2.78 1.02 4.20% 36%
MTB M & T Bank Corp. 74.15 7.11% 10.44 7.10 2.80 3.78% 39%
FNFG First Niagara Financial Group Inc.  10.46 7.28% 15.61 0.67 0.64 6.12% 96%
MATW Matthews International Corp.  31.25 7.35% 12.86 2.43 0.32 1.02% 13%
EOG EOG Resources, Inc. 90.16 7.44% 56.70 1.59 0.64 0.71% 40%
SWK Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. 56.73 7.59% 15.80 3.59 1.64 2.89% 46%
BOH Bank of Hawaii Corp. 40.13 7.62% 11.91 3.37 1.80 4.49% 53%
GS Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.   107.49 7.73% 10.54 10.20 1.40 1.30% 14%
ALB Albemarle Corp. 46.3 7.77% 10.72 4.32 0.66 1.43% 15%
PAYX Paychex, Inc.  27.08 7.80% 19.07 1.42 1.24 4.58% 87%
CYN City National Corp. 42.13 7.89% 13.95 3.02 0.80 1.90% 26%
PRK Park National Corp. 53.56 7.92% 12.06 4.44 3.76 7.02% 85%
ATNI Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. 32.6 7.95% 31.65 1.03 0.88 2.70% 85%
FFIN First Financial Bankshares, Inc.  28.23 8.00% 13.70 2.06 0.96 3.40% 47%
CWT California Water Service 18.05 8.41% 18.61 0.97 0.62 3.43% 64%
WEYS Weyco Group, Inc.  22.81 8.41% 18.85 1.21 0.64 2.81% 53%
JCI Johnson Controls Inc   30.19 8.48% 13.48 2.24 0.64 2.12% 29%
THFF First Financial Corp. 28.75 8.49% 11.88 2.42 0.94 3.27% 39%
SHW Sherwin-Williams Co. 75.37 8.49% 16.53 4.56 1.46 1.94% 32%
TRV The Travelers Companies, Inc. 50.61 8.56% 9.57 5.29 1.64 3.24% 31%
BANF BancFirst Corp.  34.61 8.60% 12.49 2.77 1.08 3.12% 39%
EGN Energen Corp. 47.11 8.75% 12.30 3.83 0.54 1.15% 14%
TRMK Trustmark Corp.  20.24 8.88% 12.19 1.66 0.92 4.55% 55%
WMT Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 52.65 8.98% 11.20 4.70 1.46 2.77% 31%
CB Chubb Corp.   60.39 9.03% 8.69 6.95 1.56 2.58% 22%
BMO Bank of Montreal 60.07 9.08% 11.55 5.20 2.82 4.69% 54%
AVP Avon Products, Inc. 22.1 9.14% 12.92 1.71 0.92 4.16% 54%
UMBF UMB Financial Corp.  36.79 9.17% 14.96 2.46 0.78 2.12% 32%
DNB Dun & Bradstreet Corp. 66.59 9.25% 12.96 5.14 1.44 2.16% 28%
FFIC Flushing Financial Corp.  11.20 9.27% 8.55 1.31 0.52 4.64% 40%
ASBC Associated Banc-Corp.  10.32 9.32% 32.25 0.32 0.04 0.39% 13%
ARE Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. 68.56 9.57% 23.97 2.86 1.80 2.63% 63%
HNZ HJ Heinz Co. 51.52 9.66% 17.12 3.01 1.92 3.73% 64%
FUL HB Fuller Company 20.89 9.95% 12.90 1.62 0.30 1.44% 19%
SEIC SEI Investments Company  16.88 9.97% 13.84 1.22 0.24 1.42% 20%
BMS Bemis Co Inc 31.25 10.00% 15.55 2.01 0.96 3.07% 48%
GCI Gannett Co Inc 10 10.05% 4.73 2.13 0.32 3.18% 15%
ADM Archer Daniels Midland Co. 28.62 10.08% 9.14 3.13 0.64 2.24% 20%
AFL AFLAC Inc. 36.33 10.09% 9.56 3.80 1.20 3.30% 32%
CBU Community Bank System, Inc. 23.99 10.30% 12.30 1.95 1.04 4.34% 53%
AOS AO Smith Corp. 37.51 10.32% 11.20 3.35 0.64 1.71% 19%
CHFC Chemical Financial Corp.  16.74 10.42% 12.49 1.34 0.80 4.78% 60%
APD Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 82.36 10.43% 15.34 5.37 2.32 2.82% 43%
EXPD Expeditors International of Washington, Inc.  44.33 10.44% 25.33 1.75 0.50 1.13% 29%
WFC Wells Fargo & Co. 24.95 10.50% 9.67 2.58 0.48 1.92% 19%
MUR Murphy Oil Corporation 52.21 10.52% 10.59 4.93 1.10 2.11% 22%
EMR Emerson Electric Co. 45.74 10.56% 14.12 3.24 1.38 3.02% 43%
UBSI United Bankshares, Inc.  21.52 10.70% 13.04 1.65 1.20 5.58% 73%
FII Federated Investors Inc 17.75 10.87% 11.02 1.61 0.96 5.41% 60%
GE General Electric Co 16.33 10.94% 12.86 1.27 0.60 3.67% 47%
STT State Street Corp. 34.43 10.96% 10.90 3.16 0.72 2.09% 23%
77 Companies

Watch List Summary
Topping our list this week is a life insurance company, American National (ANAT), which is selling at half of its book value.  With a 4.35% dividend yield and a conservative dividend payout ratio, ANAT should entice most patience investors to look into this company.  We've initiated a 5% position of this company in our portfolio.
Another company we like and have mentioned many times is Sysco (SYY).  We again bring back the concept of using dividend yield to gauge valuation.  Sysco historically is undervalued at 2% thus making it very attractive at current levels.  If the yield returns to the historical undervalued range, the potential upside would be 90%.  With a payout ratio sitting at 53%, the earnings could take a hit and the dividend is would still be safe. We've initiated a 5% position of this company in our portfolio.
Pepsi Co. (PEP) is another name we'd like to highlight.  The earnings predictability of Pepsi Co. is high and investors could possibly extract additional information on key metrics such as cash flow or dividend outlook.  According to its historical trend, anytime Pepsi trades above 2.2% dividend yield, the stock is considered undervalued.  The current yield of 3.32% could reward long-term investor with 50% upside in a fairly short period of time.

Top Five Performance Review

In our ongoing review of the NLO Dividend Watch List, we have taken the top five stocks in our database from September 17, 2010 (not published) and have checked their performance one year later. The top five companies on that list can be seen in the table below.



Symbol Name 2010 Price 2011 Price % change
WST West Pharmaceutical 33.43 40.07 19.86%
OMI Owens & Minor, Inc. 26.63 29.89 12.24%
WFSL Washington Federal, Inc.  14.59 14.99 2.74%
FUL HB Fuller Company 19.32 20.89 8.13%
CSL Carlisle Companies Inc. 29.31 37.15 26.75%
Average 13.94%
DJI Dow Jones Industrial 10,607.85 11,509.09 8.50%
SPX S&P 500 1,125.59 1,216.01 8.03%

Last year's top five outperformed the market by more than 5%.  The best performer was Carlisle (CSL) whose share have risen as high as 73% and that occurred within 7 months.  West Pharma (WST) rose as high as 40% in just 6 months.

Disclaimer:

On our current list, we excluded companies that have no earnings. Stocks that appear on our watch lists are not recommendations to buy. Instead, they are the starting point for doing your research and determining the best company to buy. Ideally, a stock that is purchased from this list is done after a considerable decline in the price and extensive due diligence. We suggest that readers use the March 2009 low (or the companies' most distressed level in the last 2 years) as the downside projection for investing. Our view is to embrace the worse case scenario prior to investing. A minimum of 50% decline or the November 2008 to March 2009 low, whichever is lower, would fit that description. It is important to place these companies on your own watch list so that when the opportunity arises, you can purchase them with a greater margin of safety. It is our expectation that, at the most, only 1/3 of the companies that are part of our list will outperform the market over a one-year period.



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A Contrarian Indicator That Says the Gold Run Isn’t Over…Yet

As the saying goes, “once something becomes mainstream the investment opportunity probably has passed.”  In some instances, the magazine cover is the most recognized way to tell if a concept, idea or person has gone mainstream.  But how do we know this is really the case?  Except for the anecdotal evidence that fits someone fancy or the less than anecdotal evidence that was published here, there has been little proof to demonstrate that such a contrarian indicator is reliable or accurate.
 
The recent rise in the price of gold has many wondering if we have reached the stage where, as an investment theme, it has gone mainstream.  Since July 1999, the average price of gold has risen from $255.81 to the most recent high of $1,900.  For any commodity price to rise so much, let alone the dramatic increase in the stocks represented in that industry, should warrant some cause for concern.
As a contrarian indicator, we could look at the many magazine covers out there to make our determination of whether gold has gone mainstream.  However, using such an indicator can take a lot of cover stories and a substantial amount of time before we eventually could consider ourselves correct.  The number of missed opportunities and inaccurate calls for a market top would be many.
However, with the advent of keyword searches and proprietary databases, we can look at the historical significance of all mentions of gold. We have chosen to use the Proquest Complete database covering Barron’s from May 1921 until the present.  Although this will likely include advertisements, we’re willing to believe that the increase in ads about gold would correspondingly increase when there is more interest in the precious metal.  Not surprisingly, advertisers spend more when they shouldn’t and spend less when they should spend more.
In the chart below we see, on a 10-year basis, the number of times that gold is mentioned in Barron’s from May 1921 until August 2011.  For reasons that shall be explained, the decade of the 1930’s and 1980’s were periods when the number of gold mentions peaked. 

Our observation is that the peak in the number of mentions on the topic of gold occurred after major turning points in the price of gold.  The bar chart below shows the decade of the 1930’s in greater detail.  The year of 1932 shows the most articles written on gold.  The decline in interest after 1932 reflects the herd mentality of diminished expectations for gold after England’s September 21,1931 departure from the gold standard.
The impact of England’s suspension of the gold standard led to a domino effect of countries abandoning the gold standard. Denmark, Norway and Sweden abandoned the standard by the end of the same month.  In October 1931, Finland was next to go off the gold standard.  Those that remained on the gold standard in Europe suffered huge losses due to the devaluation of their large holdings of British pounds in their treasury.  The belief at the time was that the currency would always be backed by the set price of gold.

However, after many countries departed from the gold standard, the price of gold stocks began to bottom.  With fewer articles on the topic of gold after 1932, the bull market in precious metal stocks was just beginning as demonstrated in the chart below of gold and silver stocks from 1924 to 1933. 
During the financial crisis from 1929 to 1932, it seems as if gold was popular in Barron’s until it was no longer being propped by governments through the use of a gold standard.  Once freely able to find a price, the process of gold stocks bottoming was inevitable.
After the peak in the price of gold in 1979/1980, Barron’s was again late in the most mentions of gold.  However, the period that followed the 1980’s peak in mentions of gold held at very high levels as the die-hard gold bugs were unwilling to accept the reality of the disinflationary environment that the world economy was entering.
In the chart below, we observed that a significant drop-off in mentions of gold after 1987 may have to do with the fact that gold stocks declined equally as much as the Dow in the same period of time.  Since the decline in gold stocks couldn’t offset the losses of stocks as anticipated, anyone who would have claimed that gold stocks were a refuge during a declining market had all the evidence to demonstrate that such a notion was foolhardy.

In light of the fact that we believe that we’re in a secular bull market in gold stocks, as indicated in our 2010 article (found here) or in our September 2009 article on silver being the best play on the rise of gold (article here), our expectation is that the number of mentions in gold need to match the levels of 1980 or 1932 before we’d be concerned that the lagging contrarian indicator of Barron’s mentions of gold has any relevance on future long-term price declines in the metal and gold stocks.
Because we believe that gold stocks act like perpetual options on the price of gold, we’d select the gold stocks from the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Stock Index (XAU).  The following are our top choices from the XAU index:
1. Freeport-McMoran (FCX)-  Freeport-McMoRan is within 10% of the 52-week low and has a dividend payout ratio of 17%.  The P/E ratio is at a modest level of 7 times earnings.  Value Line indicates that FCX is selling at least 35% below historical fair value.  Since 2004, FCX has traded up to its estimated fair value and then retrenched.  Investors in FCX should expect to sell at the $62 level and rotate into other relatively underpriced gold stocks at that time.
2. AngloGold Ashanti (AU)- At the end of last year (2010) AngloGold's total reserves amounted to 71.2 million ounces. The stock is within 15% of the 52-week low and has a dividend payout ratio of 13%.  The trailing P/E is 22 but they are expected to grow their earning next year, which brings their forward P/E to 9.5.  According to Value Line, AU is trading only 6% below its historical fair value.  Using the 5-year historical book value of 4 as a benchmark, the current book value of 3.8 suggests a 5% discount to the average.
3. Kinross Gold (KGC)- Kinross operates in hte Americas, Africa, and Russia.  At the end of 2010, its proven reserves were 62.4 million ounces of gold, 90.9 million ounces of silver, and 1.4 billion pounds of copper.  The stock is currently trading just 1.3x its book value.  If the 5-year history is any measure, the stock should rise 77% and trade at 2.3x book value.  The company continued to increase its dividend over the years.  Started in 2008, Kinross paid $0.08 per share and now it pays $0.10.  The current payout ratio of 10% along with current gold price implies that dividend increases maybe around the corner.
4.Gold Fields (GFI)- Gold Fields engages in acquisition, exploration, development, and production of gold.  At the end of 2010, their gold equivalent reserves stood at 78 million ounces.  The company's P/E of 40 is high and price-to-book ratio is fair.  While the current dividend yield of 1.7% appears to be high for a gold stock, that dividend is heavily dependent upon the profitability of their business. GFI's dividend policy is to pay out 50% of its cash earnings depending upon investment opportunities.
    

 5. Barrick Gold (ABX)-  According to Value Line investment survey, Barrick Gold is fairly valued at 10 times cashflow.  With an estimated 2011 cash flow of $6.10 per share, Barrick Gold (ABX) is selling 13.72% below fair value as of September 13, 2011.  Despite having a low dividend yield, Barrick has a sustainable dividend payout ratio of 12%, allowing for a substantial decline in earnings if necessary.

Our ranking of the gold stocks above is strictly based on those that are closest to the low and part of the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Stock Index (XAU).  Aggressive precious metal investors can also participate in the extremely popular SPDRGold Share (GLD) ETF or the highly volatile iShares Silver Trust (SLV) for greater potential gain and/or loss. 

We believe that a correction in gold stocks, beyond the trading range that has been established in the XAU since October 2010, is still on the horizon.  Therefore, we believe that these stocks and funds can be bought at lower prices.
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In the News: September 10, 2011

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Nasdaq 100 Watch List: September 9, 2011

Below are the Nasdaq 100 companies that are within 6% of their respective 52-week lows.  Keep in mind that we received a Dow Theory Bear Market indication on August 2, 2011 (article here).  This means that we have reallocated our positions to much lower levels than when we had a bull market indication on July 24, 2009 (article here).

Symbol Name Trade P/E EPS Yield P/B Div/Shr payout ratio % from Low
QGEN Qiagen N.V. 13.87 25.22 0.55 0 1.30 0 0.65%
ESRX Express Scripts, Inc. 43.67 17.89 2.44 0 12.25 0 0.81%
FISV Fiserv, Inc. 51.47 16.88 3.05 0 2.44 0 1.00%
INFY Infosys Limited 47.17 17.34 2.72 1.70% 4.57 0.85 31.25% 1.46%
AMAT Applied Materials 10.73 7.39 1.45 2.90% 1.67 0.32 22.07% 2.14%
PAYX Paychex, Inc. 25.93 18.26 1.42 4.60% 6.44 1.24 87.32% 3.22%
BMC BMC Software 38.46 15.19 2.53 0 4.23 0 3.41%
FSLR First Solar, Inc. 84.96 14.48 5.87 0 2.03 0 3.47%
WCRX Warner Chilcott plc 14.95 31.81 0.47 0 141.57 0 4.18%
URBN Urban Outfitters 24.56 16.63 1.48 0 3.01 0 4.51%
EXPD Expeditors Intl of Wash. 42.06 24.03 1.75 1.10% 4.88 0.5 28.57% 4.78%
VOD Vodafone Group Plc 25.77 10.6 2.43 7.30% 0.95 1.92 79.01% 4.80%
NIHD NII Holdings, Inc. 36.18 14.7 2.46 0 1.67 0 4.84%
VRSN VeriSign, Inc. 29.03 6.47 4.49 0 N/A 0 4.99%
PCAR PACCAR Inc. 35.38 17.96 1.97 2.00% 2.26 0.72 36.55% 5.20%
SIAL Sigma-Aldrich 59.18 17.45 3.39 1.10% 3.27 0.72 21.24% 5.34%
DTV DIRECTV 41.42 13.66 3.03 0 N/A 0 5.89%
CA CA Inc. 19.71 11.87 1.66 1.00% 1.76 0.2 12.05% 5.91%

From this list, we have initiated new positions in Applied Materials (AMAT) and Expeditors International of Washington (EXPD) on Friday September 9, 2011 equal to 5% of our portfolio, respectively.  As these stocks decline we expect to add to our positions.

Disclaimer:

On our current list, we excluded companies that have no earnings. Stocks that appear on our watch lists are not recommendations to buy. Instead, they are the starting point for doing your research and determining the best company to buy. Ideally, a stock that is purchased from this list is done after a considerable decline in the price and extensive due diligence. We suggest that readers use the March 2009 low (or the companies' most distressed level in the last 3 years) as the downside projection for investing. Our view is to embrace the worse case scenario prior to investing. A minimum of 50% decline or the November 2008 to March 2009 low, whichever is lower, would fit that description. It is important to place these companies on your own watch list so that when the opportunity arises, you can purchase them with a greater margin of safety. It is our expectation that, at the most, only 1/3 of the companies that are part of our list will outperform the market over a one-year period.
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PG&E fleeces investors and consumers alike

On August 30, 2011, the National Highway Safety Board (NHSB) issued a report (report here) on the pipeline "accident" in San Bruno, California where numerous homes and lives were lost due to negligence on the part of PG&E (PCG).  The NHSB cited at least 28 issues with the way PG&E inappropriately handled the gas pipelines under their control.
 
This reminds us of the “ring-fenced” strategy that PG&E (PCG) employed just before filing bankruptcy in 2002 (our reference and citation here).  The Federal Energy Regulatory  Commission (FERC) approved a plan from PG&E to shelter it’s profitable assets and only included the money losing divisions in the bankruptcy proceedings.
 
Again, PG&E (PCG) has managed to stick it to both the investors and consumers.

In the News: September 3, 2011

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There is no such thing as a Sophisticated Investor

We listen to Bob Brinker every weekend and his manner of steam rolling the listeners gets annoying at times.  However, Diana Henriques is one of the few guest authors who (1) gets challenged directly by Bob Brinker and (2) solidly holds her ground with a lucid explanation on how Bernie Madoff and mutual funds have more in common than most people are willing to admit.
The following is a transcript, in part, of a recent interview that Bob Brinker had with Diana Henriques about her book Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust.  Diana is clear on one thing that all investors should understand, even a well known and well established mutual fund company should be questioned on it's integrity.  The clarity in Diana Henriques' responses while getting grilled by Bob Brinker requires that we recommend reading this book.
Diana Henriques:

 

…there on your statement, it looked like you owned a widely diversified portfolio of blue chips, everything from J&J to Wal-Mart, and so you had this sense, ‘well I am kinda diversified,’ there was this illusion of  a diverse portfolio and you move into cash safely and into treasury bonds and back into these blue chips, so not to defend people who were willing to trust every penny they had to Bernie Madoff, they may have been deluded by the notion that they did have a balanced and very highly diverse portfolio almost like a mutual fund, of course it was nothing like a mutual fund, in fact, and the notion that you would give all your money to Bernie Madoff, in hindsight, of course looked dreadful, but how many of your listeners actually invest all of their money with Vanguard or different mutual funds but they will invest it all with a fund family because of the convenience that comes with it."
Bob Brinker:

 

(interrupting Diana) "That’s a good point, that’s a good point, but I’m willing to propose to you that a listener that invests with the Vanguard, a listener that invests with a Fidelity, a listener that invests with a T. Rowe Price, can simply not be compared to somebody giving their money to Bernie Madoff.  He is not Vanguard, he is not Fidelity, he is not T. Rowe Price."
  
Diana Henriques:

 

"Yeah, but neither is he Joe’s Plumbing and Ponzi Scheme operation down on the corner.  He was a very respectable."
Bob Brinker:

 

(interrupting Diana) "No but actually he was that Diana, he had a po-dunk auditing system set up in a storefront in NY, I mean, he was Joe’s Plumbing and Heating."
Diana Henriques:

 

"I’ve got to disagree with you there because I knew Bernie Madoff back when he was in the wild before he was in captivity, and I knew his firm very well.  As a reporter at Barron’s it was one of the first places you’d call if were trying to find out what news, what impact, breaking news would had had on specific stocks or segments of stocks.  For example, the night the first gulf war broke out, it hit us in NY at a very tough time right against our deadline for the next day’s business section.  We took the whole section apart and put it back together again.   Well, what would the out break of war going to mean to the oil stocks?  How do you find out? The NYSE had been closed for hours.  You called Bernie Madoff, because he pioneered after hours trading.  There was a period in time when Madoff’s trading firm handled up to 10% of the daily volume of the NYSE stocks;  in what is called the third market.  We didn’t know him as retail investors, I knew him as a business reporter, but he had no retail customers, so far as we knew.  He was a wholesale trading house but he was very well known on the street as a whole sale trading house one of the biggest, one the fastest, one of the most technologically advanced and a firm that had always set the standard for the speed of processing orders, so I have to disagree with you, people who knew wall street and who did a little 'due diligence' on Bernie Madoff would have learned that he was a very well respected wholesale trader."

 

Bob Brinker:

 

"All of which led them to the false conclusion that he was someone that you could do business with."

 

Diana Brinker:

 

"Yes…and he was someone that they could trust."

 

Bob Brinker:

 

(interrupts Diana while she is talking) (incredulously says...) "TRUST!…are you serious Diana?…you could trust!…what do you mean you could trust?"

 

Diana Henriques:

 

"He was someone certainly that they thought they could trust clearly they would not have given their money to him otherwise.  On the surface, you know Bill, a shifty eyed guy with a cheap suit and scoffed shoes may commit a lot of crimes but a ponzi scheme is never going to be one of them.  Ponzi schemers are by definition done by people who seem trustworthy, if they’re not they can’t even start.  The can’t pull it off.  So, people who think they would instantly recognize a crook like Bernie Madoff, are deluding themselves.  That’s one of the dangerous lies we tell ourselves.  They’re going to look like responsible respectable people."

 

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